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SUMMARY
This article examines Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the Banda Islands in the
period from 1609 to 1621, with a particular focus on the process of
claiming initiated by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and English
East India Company (EIC). Historians have paid little attention to the
precise legal justiﬁcations employed by these organisations, and how
they affected the outcome of events. For both companies, treaties with
Asian rulers and peoples were essential in staking out claims to trade
and territory. Because so many different parties were involved, individual
documents had to serve multiple purposes, both on the ground in the
East Indies and at the negotiating tables back in Europe. Whenever a
VOC or EIC ofﬁcial presented a treaty to a Bandanese leader, he had to
recognise local power structures in the Spice Islands, but also needed to
consider his European competitors in the area, his superiors in Batavia or
Bantam, and the company directors back in Amsterdam or London.
Consequently, the safest and most reliable course of action was to make
as many arguments as possible, piling them on top of one another. The
result was an inherently messy process of claiming, yet one that was
also clearly intelligible to most parties involved, including Asian rulers
and peoples. A constantly changing legal suite extended to freedom of
trade and navigation, contracts and alliances with native peoples, just
war, conquest, actual possession, and the (perceived) surrender of native
sovereignty to European authorities.
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1. Introduction
Located two thousand kilometres east of Java, the Banda Islands—a group of seven small islands,
including one volcano, the Gunung Api—are now a forgotten backwater in the Republic of Indonesia.
It used to be very different. For centuries, the Spice Islands—meaning the Moluccas, Ambon, and the
Banda Islands—were part of an Asian trading network connecting the island of Java with the Philip-
pines and the South China Sea. Merchants from ports on Java’s north coast frequented the Banda
Islands on a regular basis, exchanging rice from Java and textiles from the Indian subcontinent for nut-
meg and mace. They brought Islam as well. Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, state development was
slow in the Banda Islands. Confederations of villages competed with each other, primarily ulilima (a
group of ﬁve villages) and ulisiva (a group of nine villages). Orangkayas (i.e., aristocrats, with wealth
from trade) met on the island of Nera in order to reduce conﬂict between villages and negotiate trade
deals. Although the Bandanese successfully played off Javanesemerchants against each other, they had
become dependent on the spice trade for their livelihoods. Not much was left of the islands’ original
subsistence economy by the time the ﬁrst Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century.1
Nutmeg, mace, and cloves had reached Europe via ports in the Middle East during the Middle
Ages. One of the aims of European expansion into Asia was to cut out Muslim middlemen and estab-
lish direct trade links with the Spice Islands. The Portuguese were the ﬁrst to reach the Banda Islands.
However, they were not able to establish a military presence there, in sharp contrast with the Moluc-
cas and Ambon, where they built and garrisoned fortresses. Nor did the Portuguese obtain any special
trading privileges in the Banda Islands, but traded on the same footing as Javanese merchants.2
The situation in the Banda Islands changed completely when the Dutch East India Company
(VOC) appeared on the scene. Swift Dutch penetration of Southeast Asia went hand in hand with
naked aggression against both Portuguese and indigenous shipping. The voyage of Pieter Willems-
zoon Verhoef (1573–1609)—the VOC’s so-called Fourth Voyage (1607–1612)—was crucial in tip-
ping the balance of power in the Banda Islands. For the ﬁrst time, the Bandanese had to accept a
European military presence in their country. Dutch fortresses were established on Nera in 1609,
on Pulo Way in 1616 and on Great Banda (also known as Lonthor) in 1621. Yet the indigenous
inhabitants had no intention of surrendering without a ﬁght, and took up arms against the VOC.
An already complex situation was rendered yet more complicated by the presence of merchants
and mariners employed by the English East India Company (EIC), who were eager to advance
their own trading interests while sabotaging those of their Dutch rivals.3
Given the high stakes, Anglo–Dutch imperial competition in the Banda Islands in the period from
1609 to 1621 has attracted sustained attention, but little detailed scholarship. For English
1Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, 2 vols (New Haven, CT, 1988), I, 11–31, 90–96, II, 1–61, 114–73;
Ashin Das Gupta, ‘The Maritime Trade of Indonesia, 1500–1800’, in India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800, edited by Ashin Das
Gupta and M. N. Pearson (Oxford, 1987), 240–75; Gerrit Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen: De VOC en de bevolking van Ambon,
1656–1696 (second edition, Leiden, 2004).
2John Villiers, ‘Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century’, Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), 723–50; Bernard
H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge, MA, 1944), 68–90.
3Hof en Handel: Aziatische Vorsten en de VOC, 1620–1720, edited by Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (Leiden, 2004);
De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie, edited by Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (Leiden, 2002); Giles
Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg: How One Man’s Courage Changed the Course of History (London, 1999); Vincent C. Loth, ‘Armed Inci-
dents and Unpaid Bills: Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Banda Islands in the Seventeenth Century’, Modern Asian Studies, 29 (1995),
705–40; John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company (New York, NY, 1993); George Massel-
man, The Cradle of Colonialism (New Haven, CT, 1963); K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-
Stock Company 1600–1640 (New York, NY, 1965); William Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade (London, 1933).
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propagandists, the events in the Banda Islands were evidence of VOC perﬁdy. At the time, the English
clergyman Samuel Purchas (1577–1626) narrated the dramatic events in Hakluytus Posthumus, or,
Purchas his Pilgrimes (London, 1624/5), a panegyric of English expansion overseas. Since it repro-
duces many documents from the EIC archives and since a reprint appeared in 1905–1907, it is Pur-
chas’s story that tends to be replicated in the modern English-language literature, most recently in
Giles Milton’s Nathaniel’s Nutmeg: How One Man’s Courage Changed the Course of History (1999).
Yet it is dangerous to treat Purchas his Pilgrimes as plain historical fact, as the author also intended
it to be a work of anti-Catholic and proto-nationalist propaganda. Purchas his Pilgrimes became a
foundational text for the EIC, in fact. Copies were still sent to its trading posts in Asia as late as the
1680s.4
In the Dutch-language literature, the VOC’s brutal conquest of the Banda Islands has become
inextricably intertwined with the reputation of Governor-General Jan Pieterzoon Coen (1587–
1629). In a multi-volume source publication, the Dutch archivist J. K. J. de Jonge (1828–1880)
arrived at the damning conclusion that the Dutch capture of Great Banda in 1621 had left an ‘indel-
ible bloodstain’ on Coen’s reputation. J. A. van der Chijs (1831–1905), director of the Landsarchief in
Batavia (now Arsip Nasional in Jakarta), echoed these sentiments in a short monograph on the estab-
lishment of Dutch sovereignty in the Banda Islands in the period 1599 to 1621. It was the conserva-
tive Dutch historian C. Gerretson (1884–1958), a ﬁrm believer in Dutch imperialism, and his student
L. Kiers, who sought to defend their hero Coen against what they considered the unjust strictures of
De Jonge and Van der Chijs. In a Nazi-occupied Netherlands, they published two short studies
claiming that the ethnic cleansing which followed Coen’s capture of Great Banda was all perfectly
legitimate according to the legal standards of seventeenth-century Europe. They conveniently
ignored the fact that contemporary Dutch accounts had already deplored the Governor-General’s
‘cruel procedures’. Coen’s biographer Jurriën van Goor takes a more even-handed approach than
Gerretson. He does not downplay or deny Coen’s share in the murder and mayhem. However,
he emphasizes the VOC directors’ long-term strategy to acquire a monopoly of the spice trade,
and also relates the dramatic events of 1621 to developments in international politics, such as the
expiry of the Twelve Years Truce in Europe and the VOC’s uneasy relationship with the EIC.
Still, by its very nature, Van Goor’s magisterial biography focuses on Coen’s life and career, rather
than on other high-ranking company servants who contributed to the formulation and implemen-
tation of VOC policy. Coen only visited the Banda Islands twice, as a junior merchant in 1609 and as
Governor-General twelve years later. We may want to ﬁnd out what happened in between.5
4David Armitage, ‘Purchas, Samuel (bap. 1577, d. 1626)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2007, http://www.oxforddnb.
com/view/article/22898 [accessed 18 August 2015]; Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes, Contayning a
History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others (Hakluyt Society extra series), 20 vols (Glasgow,
1905–1907); Milton, Nathaniel’s Nutmeg; Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty & the Early Modern Foundations
of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011), viii, 71, 107.
5De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië, edited by J. K. J. de Jonge, 13 vols (The Hague, 1862–1909), IV, lxi, cxliii;
J. A. van der Chijs, De vestiging van het Nederlandsche Gezag over de Banda-eilanden, 1599–1621 (Batavia, 1886). On J. K. J. de
Jonge and J. A. van der Chijs, see Nieuw Nederlandsch Biograﬁsch Woordenboek, edited by P. J. Blok and P. C. Molhuysen, 10 vols
(Leiden, 1911–1937), IV, columns 815–16, X, columns 171–72; L. Kiers, Coen op Banda: de conqueste getoetst aan het recht van den
tijd (Utrecht, 1943); C. Gerretson, Coens Eerherstel (Amsterdam, 1944); G. Puchinger, ‘Gerretson, Frederik Carel (1884–1958)’, in
Biograﬁsch Woordenboek van Nederland, edited by J. Charité; I. Schöffer; A. J. C. M. Gabriëls et alii, 6 vols. (The Hague: Instituut
voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1979-2009); ‘Rapport van Personen Komende uit Oost-Indie, 1622’ and ‘Verhaal van Eenige Oor-
logen in Indië, 1622’, in Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht XXVII (1871), 321–39 (criticism of the harsh
treatment of Bandanese prisoners in Jakarta in 1621 on p. 329), 497–576, 583–658 (criticism of the beheading of Bandanese
orangkayas in 1621 on p. 511); Jurriën van Goor, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 1587–1629: Koopman-Koning in Azië (Amsterdam,
2015), 433–66. ‘Rapport van Personen Komende uit Oost-Indie, 1622 [Account from several people who arrived in Amsterdam
from the East Indies in 1622]’ and ‘Verhaal van Eenige Oorlogen in Indië [History of several wars in the Indies]’ are extant in the
Van Hilten ﬁles at the Utrecht provincial archives. The States of Utrecht received a scribal copy of the ‘Rapport’ on 3 November
1622. Both documents contain offhand comments suggesting that the author(s) was/were (a) high-ranking VOC servant(s) who
had returned to the Dutch Republic quite recently. He/they compiled the reports on the basis of his/their own experiences in
Southeast Asia and conversations with VOC personnel who had returned to the Dutch Republic after he/they did. The author
of ‘Verhaal van Eenige Oorlogen in Indië’ warned that the events of 1621 might result in a lot of bad press for the VOC.
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This article focuses on Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the Banda islands, in particular on how the two
sides justiﬁed territorial expansion. Little attention has been paid so far to the claims and counter-
claims made by VOC and EIC servants in their efforts to secure the spice trade, or how justiﬁcations
of empire affected the outcome of events. This is not surprising. By its very nature, Anglo–Dutch
imperial competition in seventeenth-century Asia presents us with a complicated story, involving
many actors, which does not lend itself to easy summary. The endless twists and turns, all meticu-
lously recorded in the archives, mean that the rivalry cannot be reduced to a single moment or a single
argument. This article focuses on the long process of claiming in the Banda Islands during the period
from 1609 to 1621, and seeks to show the range of arguments that were deployed by both sides.
Whereas Patricia Seed and other scholars have argued that European claims were essentially
unintelligible to all but their own national groups, my case study of Anglo–Dutch imperial compe-
tition in the Banda Islands shows the exact opposite. Both VOC and EIC servants concluded con-
tracts and treaties with native peoples, which, in turn, they used to confront European
competitors. They routinely issued written ultimatums to each other, threatening violent action
on their own part if the other party failed to right an alleged wrong. They justiﬁed the (potential)
use of armed force by reference to an unstable hierarchy of claims, based in natural law—freedom
of trade, freedom of navigation, contracts and alliances with native peoples, just war, conquest, actual
possession, and the (perceived) surrender of native sovereignty to European authorities. None of this
should necessarily surprise us. In their 2010 article ‘Acquiring Empire by Law’, Lauren Benton and
Benjamin Straumann identify a ‘common repertoire of ceremonies of acquisition and possession’
that was used by different European groups. As Benton notes elsewhere, most European merchants
and mariners who engaged in overseas exploration had a rough and ready understanding of the var-
ious modes of claims-making. But although VOC and EIC servants recognised the validity of each
other’s arguments, they constructed very different hierarchies of claims. Each side maintained that it
presented stronger arguments than the other.6
There was a close correlation between the changing situation on the ground in the Banda Islands
in the period 1609–1621 and the claims-making of VOC and EIC ofﬁcials. Crucially, the treaties con-
cluded with native peoples and the written exchanges between company servants connected them
with the negotiating tables back in Europe. It was two-way trafﬁc, of course. Agreements reached
in London (1613) and The Hague (1615) were intended to reduce tension and conﬂict on the ground
What, after all, was the difference between Spanish tyranny in the West Indies—so frequently denounced in the war propaganda
of the Dutch Republic—and Coen’s bloodstained rule in the Banda Islands?
6Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession: Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) p. 179, 13; Martine
Julia van Ittersum, Proﬁt and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595-
1615, Brill Intellectual History Series (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006) pp. 359-483; Lauren Benton and Benjamin Strau-
mann, ‘Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice’, Law and History Review 28 (2010) pp.
1-38, particularly pp. 30-31; Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 ed. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York and London:
New York University Press, 2013); Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900
(CUP, 2010) and Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (CUP, 2002). Adam Clulow, “The Art of
Claiming: Possession and Resistance in Early Modern Asia,” American Historical Review 121 (1), Feb. 2016, 17–38. Justiﬁcations
of empire by the Dutch and English East India Companies have become a hot topic in the historiography. See, for example,
Peter Borschberg, ‘From Self-Defence to an Instrument of War: Dutch Privateering around the Malay Peninsula in the Early Seven-
teenth Century’, Journal of Early Modern History 17 (2013) pp. 35-52, Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese, and Free Trade in the East Indies
(NUS Press, 2011) and The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, Security and Diplomacy in the 17th Century (NUS Press, 2010);
Adam Clulow, ‘The Art of Claiming: Possession and Resistance in Early Modern Asia’, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch
Encounter with Tokugawa Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014) and ‘European Maritime Violence and Territorial
States in Early Modern Asia, 1600-1650’, Itinerario, 33 (2009) pp. 72-94; Jan A. Somers, De VOC als volkenrechtelijke actor (Kluwer,
2002); Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire ed. Philip J Stern and Carl Wennerlind
(OUP, 2014); Philip Stern, ‘Corporate Virtue: The Languages of Empire in Early Modern British Asia’, Renaissance Studies 26 (2012)
pp. 510–530 and The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (OUP,
2011); Robert Travers, ‘A British Empire by Treaty in Eighteenth-Century India’ in Saliha Belmessous (ed.), Empire by Treaty: Nego-
tiating European Expansion, 1600-1900 (OUP, 2015) pp. 132-160; Arthur Weststeijn, ‘”Love Alone Is Not Enough”: Treaties in Seven-
teenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion’ in: Belmessous (ed.), Empire by Treaty pp. 19-44, and ‘The VOC as a Company-State:
Debating Seventeenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion’, Itinerario 38 (2014) pp. 13-34; E. Wilson, The Savage Republic: De
Indis of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism and Dutch Hegemony within the Early Modern World-System, c.1600-1619 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Leiden, 2008).
4 M. J. VAN ITTERSUM
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in Asia. Frequently, it did not turn out that way. One important factor was how the results of diplo-
matic negotiations in Europe were analysed and presented in the directors’ correspondence with
their servants in the East. Another important factor was the discussions within the companies’
ranks, particularly among the top brass in Asia. Neither the VOC nor the EIC spoke with one
voice. It has become a truism to say that they acted as both trading companies and states. For
this reason alone, it should not surprise us that the archival record reveals endless policy debates.
We need to take these debates seriously if we want to write the new history of empire and understand
how, exactly, the native came to be dispossessed. As Tamar Herzog notes, it is a mistake to portray
imperial rivalry between European powers as somehow separate from confrontations between Euro-
pean powers and natives, and from conﬂicts among different native groups. These processes inﬂu-
enced each other and have to be studied in tandem.7
The Bandanese were the victims of Anglo–Dutch imperial competition in Asia in the period 1609–
1621. Caught in an upward spiral of violence, their room formanoeuvre diminished rapidly. Appeals for
help to EIC servants and indigenous leaders elsewhere (the rulers of Ternate, Makassar and Bantam,
among others) went unheeded or did not have the desired effect, also due to internal divisions among
the Bandanese. If there was a ‘middle ground’ in the Banda Islands (i.e., an equilibrium of native and
European power), it can only have existed for a ﬂeeting moment in the 1610s. A toxic combination of
warfare and treaty-making stripped the Bandanese of their liberty and independence. From a European
perspective, treaties with indigenous peoples were never meant to be agreements between equals. To
quoteHerzog, treatises were ‘instruments of containment’, aimed at realising ‘the subjection of all things
indigenous’. Even English assistance against Dutch aggression came at a high price for the Bandanese:
according to the treaty which they concludedwithNathaniel Courthope inDecember 1616, they did not
just promise the EIC all spices harvested on Pulo Run in perpetuity, but also surrendered the island to
James I of England and put themselves under the latter’s protection as his subjects. It was all to no avail.
Lacking sufﬁcient EIC support, the gamewas up for the inhabitants ofPuloRunby the timeCoen arrived
in February 1621, commanding sixteen warships and nearly one thousand soldiers.8
Coen’s brutal conquest of Great Banda is an inconvenient truth for many present-day global histor-
ians, eager to ascribe agency to indigenous peoples through various forms of ‘negotiating’ and ‘resisting’
empire. Yet the power differential between Europeans and certain native groups in Asia and the Amer-
icas is something that we ignore at our peril. At the time, many Bandanese clearly underestimated the
VOC’s determination to secure amonopoly of the spice trade and the enormous resourceswhich it could
marshal against a weak, isolated polity. Of course, there were plenty of areas in the pre-modern world
where Europeans struggled to get a foot in the door—but the Banda Islands was not one of these places.9
Coen’s punitive expedition resulted in the near-total destruction of Bandanese society. Forty-eight
orangkayas were captured, tried and executed at his order. Their relatives—nearly eight hundred old
7Tamar Herzog, ‘Struggling over Indians: Territorial Conﬂict and Alliance Making in the Heartland of South America (Seventeenth to
Eighteenth Centuries)’, in Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous, 78–100 (78). See also Van Ittersum, Proﬁt and Principle, 359–
483; Van Goor, Coen, 115–17, 143–47, 151–84, 416–20, 433–66.
8Herzog, ‘Struggling over Indians’, in Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous, 78–79; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 181–83;
Masselman, Cradle of Colonialism, 417–22; Van Goor, Coen, 433–66.
9On indigenous peoples ‘negotiating’ and ‘resisting’ empire, see, for example, Clulow, ‘The Art of Claiming’; Empire by Treaty, edited
by Belmessous; Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920, edited by Saliha Belmessous (Oxford, 2012); Mark
Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595–1674 (Leiden, 2012). In
their contributions to Empire by Treaty, Alain Beaulieu, Tamar Herzog, Daniel Richter, and Robert Travers are far less sanguine
about the natives’ ability to resist or negotiate empire than the editor, Saliha Belmessous, seems to be in her introduction.
Adam Clulow emphasises Bandanese legal resistance against the Dutch. He shows how, through both treaty texts and indigenous
ceremonies, certain Bandanese groups successfully manipulated the English into supporting them against the VOC. Clulow recog-
nises, however, that the English put their own spin on the treaty texts, and tended to overstate their case in negotiations with the
VOC. The VOC repaid the compliment, of course: it routinely over-interpreted its treaties with indigenous rulers and peoples, if
doing so served its own interest; see Clulow, ‘The Art of Claiming’; Alain Beaulieu, ‘The Acquisition of Aboriginal Land in Canada:
The Genealogy of an Ambivalent System (1600–1687)’, in Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous, 101–131; Herzog, ‘Struggling
over Indians’, in Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous; Robert Travers, ‘A British Empire by Treaty in Eighteenth-Century India’, in
Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous, 132–160; Daniel K. Richter, ‘To “Clear the King’s and Indians’ Title”: Seventeenth-Century
Origins of North American Land Cession Treaties’, in Empire by Treaty, edited by Belmessous, 45–77.
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men, women and children—were shipped off to Batavia (modern-day Jakarta), the VOC headquar-
ters in Asia, where they were put to work as slaves. In the end, there were only about one thousand of
an estimated ﬁfteen thousand original inhabitants left on the Banda Islands. Just as had happened
after the 1616 conquest of Pulo Way, the arable land on Great Banda was divided into plots called
perken and distributed among European tenants. Many of these so-called perkeniers were former
VOC soldiers. Together with company ofﬁcials, they would form the upper crust of the new colonial
society for centuries to come. In cultivating and harvesting the valuable spices, they could dispose of
a large labour force of slaves, imported by the VOC from all parts of Asia. The Dutch conquest, then,
marked a fundamental break with the past.10
Dutch and English claims-making in the Banda Islands, and how it affected the outcome of
events, is the subject of this article. My argument is based primarily on archival and printed sources
produced at the time. Three sets of documents are of particular importance: Courthope’s journal and
other documents reproduced in Purchas His Pilgrimes; the letters of various VOC ofﬁcials, such as
Cornelis Dedel and Laurens Reael, extant at the National Archives in The Hague; and the written
exchanges between Courthope and the Dutch authorities in the Banda Islands, extant at the National
Archives in Kew. When read in conjunction, these documents provide a singular insight into the
dynamics of Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the Banda Islands. The older secondary literature (in both
Dutch and English) tends to ignore what the actors on the ground said about what they were
doing. Yet there is a clear connection between thought and action—between how company servants
conceptualised claims to trade and territory and how they went about realising these. Many English-
speaking historians who undertake research on the EIC are not proﬁcient in Dutch, and are therefore
unable to consult the rich holdings of the VOC archives. Frequently, their treatment of the EIC’s
trials and tribulations in the Spice Islands is rather one-sided. Using source materials in both
Dutch and English, my aim is to correct these notable imbalances in the secondary literature.
In analysing Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the Banda Islands, this article focuses on major ﬂashpoints in
the period 1609–1621, starting with the violent death of VOC commander Pieter Willemszoon Ver-
hoef. All dates mentioned in this article are new style, unless indicated otherwise.
2. The Murder of a VOC Commander in the Banda Islands
In April 1608, the VOC directors sent a new set of instructions to their commander Pieter Willems-
zoon Verhoef (c. 1573–1609), who had left for the East six months earlier, commanding nine ships
and three yachts. The directors sought to secure the company’s interests in the Spice Islands in
anticipation of a peace or truce treaty between the Dutch Republic and Philip III of Spain and Por-
tugal. The VOC commander was told to renegotiate all existing treaties between the VOC and Asian
rulers and peoples, and to return copies of the new agreements to Amsterdam post-haste. The direc-
tors urged Verhoef to establish Dutch strongholds wherever he could, in order to reassure the indi-
genous peoples of the following:
we will always remain in good friendship with them and never join the other side, but always protect them
against Portuguese wrongdoing as much as it lies within our power’.11
10Van Goor, Coen, 433–66; Philip Winn, ‘Slavery and Cultural Creativity in the Banda Islands’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 41
(2010), 365–89; Vincent C. Loth, ‘Pioneers and Perkeniers: The Banda Islands in the 17th Century’, Cakalele, 6 (1995) 13–35;
H. E. Niemeijer, ‘“Als eene Lelye onder de doornen”: Kerk, kolonisatie en christianisering op de Banda-eilanden 1616–1635’, Do-
cumentatieblad voor de Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Zending en Overzeese Kerken I (1) (1994), 2–24; Williard A. Hanna, Indo-
nesian Banda: Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia, PA, 1978). In 1638, slaves constituted
approximately two thirds of the population of the Banda Islands. Inevitably, a degree of racial mixing occurred, with perkeniers
routinely marrying slave women. Although a steady trickle of slaves escaped to other nearby archipelagos, marronage never
threatened colonial society in the Banda Islands. At the end of the eighteenth century, there were over four thousand slaves
in the archipelago, constituting three quarters of the population.
11The Hague, Nationaal Archief (henceforth NA), VOC 478, f. 4r (instructions for VOC commanders and ofﬁcers in the East Indies, 10/
11 April 1608). See also De Reis van de Vloot van Pieter Willemsz Verhoef naar Azie, 1607–1612, edited by M.E. van Opstall, 2 vols.
(The Hague, 1972) 6. All translations are my own.
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Fortiﬁcations also served as a guarantee for the company’s commercial interests. The directors
noted that fortiﬁcations were proof that ‘we have the possession, not the Spanish and Portuguese’.
They came with exclusive trading rights. As the directors put it,
in the principal places where you conclude friendships and alliances, we recommend that you establish for-
tresses with the consent of the Indians, in order that we may secure these places and defend them as our pos-
sessions, keeping their trade for ourselves alone and excluding the Portuguese and all others.
As Benton and Straumann note, actual possession was an attractive notion for European
explorers and merchants in laying claim to something. Rather than having to establish title, it
was sufﬁcient to show that they had a better claim than other European competitors. For a
long time, the VOC directors cherished the notion that the company served as the protector
of the native peoples of the East Indies, having liberated them from Iberian ‘oppression’. The
directors wished to believe that the indigenous peoples freely consented to the establishment
of VOC fortresses and garrisons, in return for which the natives agreed, again of their own
free will, to sell their spices exclusively to the VOC in perpetuity. The reality was very different,
of course, particularly in the Banda Islands, where native inhabitants sought to play off the VOC
and EIC against each other.12
William Keeling (1577/8–1620), Admiral of the EIC’s Third Voyage (1607–1610), was engaged
in a brisk trade with various villages on Great Banda, Pulo Way and Pulo Run by the time Ver-
hoef arrived in the roadstead of Nera in early April 1609. The Bandanese showed little enthusiasm
for the exclusive military alliance-cum-trading agreement desired by the VOC directors. They
reluctantly consented to the establishment of a Dutch stronghold on Nera, out of fear that Ver-
hoef might otherwise resort to violence. According to Keeling, the Bandanese brieﬂy thought of
turning to the English for help. In conversations with Nera’s sabandar (i.e., harbour master),
he expressed his support for the native cause and suggested ‘the formall delivering of Banda,
to the use, and in the Name of his Majestie of England, our Soveraigne, before the Hollanders
did land, or begin their purposed fort’.13 Although nothing came of it, Keeling’s proposal created
a pattern for English involvement in the disputes between the VOC and the Bandanese for many
years to come.
Keeling’s position became precarious when hostilities broke out between the Dutch and the Ban-
danese. In late April, Verhoef and his men landed on the island of Nera, put the native population to
ﬂight, and started work on Castle Nassau. A month later, Verhoef accepted an invitation from the
Bandanese to negotiate a new treaty and, at their request, went to the meeting place without his cus-
tomary retinue of soldiers. The VOC commander walked straight into the trap: he was ambushed
and murdered in the jungle, along with several members of his Broad Council (Brede Raad).
Forty Dutchmen shared his fate in the days which followed. His successor, Simon Janszoon
Hoen, immediately declared war in order to avenge the murder of his countrymen. The escalating
conﬂict made Keeling suspect in the eyes of both friend and foe. Hoen openly accused Keeling of
sharing sensitive information with the Bandanese, and selling guns and ammunition as well,
which, in Hoen’s view, accounted for the stiff resistance that the Dutch were encountering in various
villages on Great Banda. Keeling received an ultimatum in late July: he was given ﬁve days to wrap up
his affairs and leave the Banda Islands, but would be recompensed for any debts that remained out-
standing among his native customers.14
Hoen’s ultimatum invoked the notions of jus conquestus and actual possession. Since VOC
soldiers had conquered the island of Nera, and since VOC commanders held commissions
from Maurice of Nassau, a sovereign prince in his own right, Hoen believed he was entitled
12NA, VOC 478, f. 1v, 2v (all quotations are taken from this source); Benton and Straumann, ‘Acquiring Empire by Law’ 16–17
13Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, II, 530-531 (all quotations taken from this source); J. K. Laughton, ‘Keeling, William (1577/8–1620)’,
rev. G. G. Harris, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.
oxforddnb.com/view/article/15243, accessed 6 March 2014].
14 De Reis van de Vloot van Verhoef, edited by Van Opstall, 94–105, 267–69; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, II, 534–39.
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to regulate trade and navigation in the waters surrounding Nera. According to Western European
rules for siege warfare, it was perfectly legitimate to ban neutrals from a war zone. As Hoen put
it:
We, by vertue of our Commission, and Patent of his Princely Excellency [Maurice of Nassau], commaund the
foresaid Generall [Keeling] to withdraw with his ship from forth our Road, out of our Fleet, and without the
command of the Artillery of the Foretresse of Nassau, within the time of ﬁve daies, after the date hereof.
And in that we have conquered, by force of Armes, the Iland Nera, so doe we also pretend, and hold the Roades
thereabout depending, as the Road of Labatacca, &c. to bee under our commaund: and will not permit any (the
time that we warre with the Bandenesses) to anchor there.
Keeling denied that he had done anything wrong, and denounced the ultimatum for containing ‘as
many untruthes as lines’. Yet he was forced to reconsider Hoen’s offer before long. When he learnt
that it would take the inhabitants of Pulo Way another twenty-ﬁve days to deliver a cargo of nutmeg
and mace, he realised that, if he waited that long, he might not be able to reach Bantam, the easterly
monsoon being almost spent. Everything seemed to go the VOC’s way: on 10 August 1609, the
natives signed a peace agreement with the Dutch, while Keeling accepted a letter of credit, ‘for
the receit of my debts left at Banda’. The Englishman departed from the archipelago four days
later, never to return.15
In signing this treaty, Hoen claimed to have concluded an agreement with ‘the honourable
orangkayas of all the islands, towns and estates of the entire Banda Islands’. In reality, the orang-
kayas of Pulo Way and Pulo Run were no parties to the agreement. Bandanese opponents of the
VOC were determined to continue their resistance on Pulo Way and Pulo Run, where they had
ﬂed from, for example, Nera. The new treaty did meet the requirements of the VOC directors,
at least on paper. The natives were now obliged to sell the entire harvest of nutmeg and mace
exclusively to the VOC. If they wanted to buy rice from Javanese merchants, they needed to obtain
the prior consent of the Dutch governor in the Banda Islands, which would only be forthcoming if
the Javanese merchants agreed to a) anchor in the roadstead of Castle Nassau, and b) sell on to the
VOC any spices obtained from the Bandanese. According to the treaty, Nera had been conquered
in its entirety ‘by reason of the murder of Admiral Verhoeff’ and was now held ‘in eternal and
hereditary possession’ by the Dutch States General, Prince Maurice and the VOC directors. Yet
it only took the arrival of David Middleton (d. 1615) in February 1610 to rupture the tenuous
peace in the Banda Islands. Middleton convinced his indigenous interlocutors that an English
ﬂeet would come to liberate them from the Dutch, thus instigating another revolt, which quickly
turned into a civil war.16
15Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus II, 539–544 (quotations on 540, 542); De Reis van de Vloot van Verhoef, edited by Van Opstall 101; S.
Groenveld, Verlopend Getij: De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse Burgeroorlog 1640-1660 (Dieren, 1984). Maurice of Nassau
(1567–1625) became sovereign Prince of Orange on the death of his eldest half brother, Philip William, Prince of Orange
(1554–1618). Yet he had been appointed Stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland well before that. The provinces that made up
the Dutch Republic effectively treated Maurice of Nassau as his father’s direct successor. Consequently, he had signed (privateer-
ing) commissions for Dutch merchants and navy captains since the 1580s. See, for example, Victor Enthoven, Zeeland en de
opkomst van de Republiek: handel en strijd in de Scheltedelta c. 1550–1621 (Luctor et Victor, 1996). In all probability, Keeling dis-
missed the ultimatum because it was too truthful to his taste. It may well have included a summary of the depositions of VOC
personnel, detailing his arm sales to the Bandanese. Copies of these depositions are still extant in the Grotius Papers at the NA:
Supplement I, f. 229–230 (‘Copy of a Declaration of Master Dirick Allerts’, 22 February 1612, which mentions Keeling explicitly), f.
389-392 (VOC petition, addressed to Dutch States General, 28 July 1612), f. 588–604 (extract from letters arrived from the East,
prepared by VOC director Dirk Meerman, 26 August 1612). Keeling was fortunate enough to have Purchas as his editor: “[t]hen
followed many presumptions of his assistance of the Bandanese, by English Powder and Munition, by signes, &c. which I omit",
see Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, II, 542.
16Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum: verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen door de Nederlanders in het
Oosten gesloten, van privilegebrieven aan hen verleend, enz., edited by J. E. Heeres and F. W. Stapel, 6 vols (The Hague, 1907–
1955), I, 66–69; De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië, edited by De Jonge, III, 315–16; Van der Chijs, De vestiging
van het Nederlandsche gezag over de Banda-eilanden, 51; Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by F. W. Stapel, 6 vols (Amster-
dam, 1939), III, 72–73; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 203–05; Van Goor, Coen, 106–11.
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3. Gerard Reynst Seeks to Prevent EIC Trade in the Banda Islands, with Particular
Reference to the Anglo–Dutch Colonial Conference of 1613
Increasingly desperate, the Bandanese opponents of the VOC continued to appeal to the English for
help. In July 1614, Benjamin Farie wrote to the EIC directors that the orangkayas of Pulo Way had
complained to the ruler of Makassar of ‘the oppression and cruelty of the Hollanders’, but also of the
EIC’s lack of support, contrary to ‘your Worships’ promise made to them by General Keeling and
Captain Middleton’. Farie reported that adverse winds and currents had prevented English ships
and Javanese junks from sailing to the Banda Islands that year. He surmised, quite rightly, that fam-
ine was the result.17
George Ball andGeorge Cockayne had better luck reaching the Banda Islands the following year. In
the middle of March 1615, the Concord and the Speedwell anchored in the roadstead of Castle Nassau.
The two English merchants quickly discovered that they had arrived ‘in the devil’s mouth or worse’.
Seven tall ships were lying at anchor in Nera’s roadstead as well. Despite the signing of the Twelve
Years Truce, the VOC continued to send powerful ﬂeets to the East Indies, aggressively pursuing a
monopoly of the spice trade. And while the EIC failed to construct a clear chain of command in
Asia—each voyage remained a separate enterprise—the VOC directors streamlined their overseas
operations by creating the ofﬁce of the Governor-General, modelled, of course, on the Portuguese
Viceroy in Goa. All VOC servants in Asia owed obedience to the Governor-General and his Council
of the Indies. It was Governor-General Gerard Reynst (c. 1568–1615), former VOC director and scion
of a powerful regent (i.e., patrician) family in Amsterdam, who awaited Ball and Cockayne at Castle
Nassau. Though courteous, Reynst was determined to prevent trade between the English and the
natives. Four months earlier, he had already taken the decision to conquer Pulo Way and establish
a Dutch fortress there. Ball was explicitly told not to go ashore on any of the Banda Islands, with
the exception of Nera, ‘whereon stands their castle’. Reynst proved as true as his word. Ball noted
in his letters that he was ‘kept back by their boats whensoever I attempted to land elsewhere’.18
In these circumstances, trade with the natives called for a combination of chutzpah and subter-
fuge. Cockayne detailed in a letter of July 1615 how, three days after their arrival, Ball and he had
visited the village of Lonthor on Great Banda in order to ‘capitulate’ with the orangkayas about
the establishment of an English trading post. Since not all orangkayas were present, no treaty
could be made on that occasion. When the two Englishmen made another attempt a few days
later, Reynst—who undoubtedly had gotten wind of the ﬁrst meeting—intervened and invited
them to Castle Nassau. Ball declined the invitation, but sent Cockayne in his stead.19
When Cockayne presented himself at Castle Nassau, he found Reynst and his council sitting at a
long table ‘with many writings before them, as if all the matters in Holland had been there to be
decided.’ The table was ﬁlled with copies of the Dutch contracts with the Bandanese and letters
from the VOC directors, including a report, written by Hugo Grotius, on the ﬁrst Anglo–Dutch colo-
nial conference in London in April and May 1613. In all likelihood, Reynst had been briefed on the
negotiations between the VOC and the EIC just before he left the Dutch Republic in early June 1613.
He explicitly referenced the negotiations in his conversation with Cockayne.20
17Letters Received By The East India Company From Its Servants In the East [hereafter EIC Letters], edited by Willam Foster, 6 volumes
(London, 1896–1902; reprinted Amsterdam, 1968), II, 78 (Benjamin Farie to the EIC, written at Patani, 26 July 1614 o.s.)
18EIC Letters, III, 286 (George Ball to John Jourdain at Bantam, 24 June 1615 o.s.); see also Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der
Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel, edited by P. A. Tiele and J. E. Heeres, 3 vols (The Hague, 1886–1895), I, xv (resolution
taken by the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies, 15 November 1614); Van Goor, Coen 116; A.J. van der Aa, Bio-
graphisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden, 21 vols. (Haarlem, 1852–1878), VI, 217–218.
19EIC Letters, III, 140–141 (George Cockayne to Sir Thomas Smythe, 16 July 1615 o.s.).
20EIC Letters, III, 141; Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 94–95; W. J.M. van Eysinga and G. N. Clark, The Colonial
Conferences between England and The Netherlands in 1613 and 1615, 2 vols., Bibliotheca Visseriana XV and XVII (The Hague, 1940–
1951); British Library, London, Additional Manuscripts 12.498 fol. 1r–19r. The Dutch negotiators returned to The Hague from
London on 31 May 1613 and reported orally to the Dutch States General that same day. Grotius put together the written report
for the Dutch States General, including detailed accounts of oral conversations with James I. The VOC directors must have
received copies of the report. Did they forward one to Reynst, who departed from Texel on 2 June 1613? Jurriën van Goor
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The Governor-General started the conversation by demanding to see Cockayne’s commission.
When the latter refused, he became angry, stood up, and, ‘ﬂuttering his papers at [Cockayne’s]
face’, denounced Ball and him as ‘rogues and rascals’. Moreover, Reynst claimed that James I of Eng-
land had taken the VOC’s side at the conference in London. He clearly knew that James I had sought
to mediate in person between the two trading companies at the Dutch delegation’s farewell audience
in late May 1613. On that occasion, Sir Thomas Smythe (1558–1625) had requested permission for
the EIC to trade in the Banda Islands on the same terms as English merchants in Holland and Zee-
land. Yet James I had agreed with the Dutch negotiators that, unless the VOC enjoyed a substantial
income from the spice trade, it could not be expected to pay for the defence of the Spice Islands—a
scenario which, the monarch noted, would only beneﬁt the Spanish and the Portuguese. As Reynst
put it, James I had ‘silenced’ Smythe, and conceded that the VOC ‘had all the right that might be
[… ] to these places of Banda’. The Governor-General could be forgiven for concluding that the
VOC enjoyed ‘more favour of his Majesty than the Company of England’. Cockayne limply replied
that it was the EIC’s ill luck to be ‘so overswayed at home’. He was not cowed by Reynst’s outburst,
however. Just a couple of nights later, Ball and he managed to slip away from Nera, and reach Pulo
Way.21
At their arrival on the island, Ball and Cockayne beached their pinnace, landed their merchandise
and started trading with the Bandanese. The inhabitants of Pulo Way turned out to be tough nego-
tiators, however. Ball and Cockayne wanted to establish an English trading post on the island, rather
than ‘lade a ship at dear rates’. Allegedly, mace was ﬂooding the markets in Europe, and could be
obtained ‘as cheap in England’ as in Asia. However, the Bandanese would have none of this. Ball
and Cockayne were told to ‘follow the fashion of Captain Keelinge’, and pay a price that would
be ‘for [the Bandaneses’] proﬁt’. Nor did inhabitants of Pulo Way want the English to stay indeﬁ-
nitely, but rather ‘to dispatch and be gone’, much like the Javanese merchants. The issue had not
been resolved yet when Ball and Cockayne departed in the Concord in late April 1615. They left
behind Richard Hunt and Sophony Cozucke (Sophonias the Cossack), Master of the Speedwell. In
the middle of May, Dutch troops landed on Pulo Way, but were driven back by the natives. Did
the attack convince the latter that a permanent English presence would be a good idea after all?
When the Speedwell departed in September 1615, ﬁlled to the brim with mace and nutmeg, Hunt
stayed put in order to continue trading with the Bandanese.22
An orangkay from Pulo Way was also on board the Speedwell. He carried a letter from the ‘prin-
cipal states’ of Pulo Way, Pulo Run and Nera, addressed to ‘general Keeling, and the principal factor
of the English at Bantam’. The letter safely reached John Jourdain (1572–1619), President of the Eng-
lish trading post in Bantam. The writers vehemently opposed the Dutch presence in their lands, and
appealed for help to James I of England, something Keeling had already suggested back in 1609. They
claimed to have heard ‘of the greate love and peace, that the King of England hath with all the world’.
Since James I was not in the habit of invading other countries, but commanded his subjects to engage
in peaceful trade, they wished to enter into a treaty with him. They feared that the Dutch—those
‘sonnes of Whores’ and ‘utter Enimyes’—were out to conquer their land and destroy their religion.
They pleaded with James I to arrange for deliveries of ‘powder, shot, cloth and rice’, and help them
‘recover the Castle of Nera’ (i.e., Castle Nassau). In return, they promised to sell their spices exclu-
sively to the English, provided the latter would not seek to ‘overthrowe our religion’ or ‘committ
offence with our Weomen’. The appeal did not fall on deaf ears. In January 1616, Jourdain resolved
suggests in his biography of Coen that the Amsterdam VOC director Reinier Pauw briefed Van Reynst in person about the nego-
tiations with the EIC. See Van Goor, Coen 227–28, 272–75 and Van Eysinga and Clark, Colonial Conferences I, annex 46, especially
145, 147.
21EIC Letters, III, 141; Van Eysinga and Clark, Colonial Conferences, I, 145–46, II, 61–62, 74–78; Van Goor, Coen, 272–75; Basil Morgan,
‘Smythe, Sir Thomas(c.1558–1625)’, in OxfordDictionary of National Biography, 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/
25908> [accessed 13 March 2014].
22EIC Letters, III, xxxiv, 142 (Cockayne to Smythe, 16 July 1615 o.s.), 286 (Ball to John Jourdain, 24 June 1615 o.s.); Foster, England’s
Quest of Eastern Trade, 202–05, 262–63; Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 95; Van Goor, Coen, 247.
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to send four ships and a yacht to the Banda Islands, under the command of Samuel Castleton. Ball
and Sophonias joined the expedition as well.23
4. The Battle for Pulo Way
Castleton reached Pulo Way in the middle of March 1616, and duly landed the Bandanese envoy. A
naval battle with a VOC ﬂeet of nine ships under the command of Jan Dirkszoon Lam (d. 1626), a
Councillor of the Indies, was called off at the last minute, when Castleton discovered that his Dutch
opponent was none other than his old friend Lam, who had come to his rescue at St Helena four
years earlier. When questioned by Lam as to whether he had sold the Bandanese any victuals,
guns or ammunition, Castleton was rather economical with the truth and denied that he had assisted
them in anyway. Yet Lamdid learn that ‘the natives of PuloWay hadwanted to surrender their land to
[the English] and ﬂy [the English] ﬂag’. Castleton signed an agreement with Lam on 26 March 1616,
and left the Banda Islands that same day, ﬁring honorary salutes. The agreement stipulated that the
English merchants on Pulo Way would maintain a strict neutrality in any armed conﬂict between
the Dutch and the Bandanese. Should Lam conquer the island, they would be permitted to leave
with their goods ‘frank and free’. If a Dutch attack proved unsuccessful, they could continue to
trade there on the same terms as before. As we shall see, Richard Hunt had no intention of sticking
to this agreement. Lam went on the attack eleven days after Castleton’s departure: he landed troops
on Pulo Way and managed to pacify the island within a month. At least four hundred Bandanese
tried to escape in boats, ﬂeeing to nearby Pulo Run, for example. Many, however, drowned at sea.24
On 3 May 1616, Lam concluded a new treaty with the Bandanese. It was signed ‘in Arabic script’
by orangkayas of the islands of Pulo Way, Pulo Run and Rosengain, by orangkayas of the village of
Labatacca on the island of Nera, and by orangkayas of the villages of Lonthor, Selamon, Dender and
Orantatta on the island of Great Banda. The orangkayas swore on the Koran to live in eternal and
unbroken peace with the Dutch and their subjects, ‘whether of the black or the white nation’. The
orangkayas relinquished any claim they might still have to Nera and Pulo Way, and recognised
that both islands had been conquered ‘in a just war’. The Bandanese agreed not to convert any deser-
ters from the Dutch garrisons to Islam, but to send them back to the Dutch governor. Similarly, the
Dutch promised not to convert any inhabitants of Rosengain, Great Banda and Pulo Run to Chris-
tianity. Spices harvested in the Banda Islands could henceforth be sold only to representatives of the
Dutch States General, Maurice of Nassau and the VOC—to the exclusion of the ‘English, French,
Javanese, Malay, Makassarese, Butonese and other European and black nations, whichever these
might be’. Mace would be purchased from the Bandanese for the ﬁxed price of 100 rials of eight
23The Register of Letters etc. of the Governour and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies ed. George Birdwood
and William Foster (London, 1893) pp. 492-493 (“A Letter from the Governour and all the principall states of the Iland Banda
called Puluway Puluroone and Nera sent vnto generall Keelinge and the principall ffactor of the English at Bantam,” s.d.); EIC
Letters, III, 294 (Sophony Cozuck to the East India Company, Bantam, 21 December, 1615 o.s.); John Jourdain, The Journal of
John Jourdain, 1608–1617, Describing His Experiences in Arabia, India, and the Malay Archipelago, edited by William Foster (Cam-
bridge, 1905), 328–29; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 262–63; J. K. Laughton, ‘Jourdain, John (c.1572–1619)’, in
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15141> [accessed 6 March 2014]; Clu-
low, ‘The Art of Claiming’ 31–32.
24Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 261–65; EIC Letters, IV, 67 (John Jourdain to the EIC, 17/27 March 1615/16), 72–74 (agree-
ment between Captain Castleton and the Dutch, 16/26 March 1615/16, in Dutch with an English translation), 74–75 (instructions
from Captain Castleton to Richard Hunt, March 1616); Jourdain, Journal, 328–29; Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by
Stapel, III, 99; Van der Aa, Biographisch Woordenboek, XI, 55–56; Bouwstoffen, I, 146 (Adriaen van der Dussen to the VOC directors,
25 July 1616); NA, VOC 1063, f. 354–55 (resolutions taken by Jan Dirkszoon Lam and his council, 21 and 27 March 1616) and f.
495r–95v (Jan Dirckszoon Lam to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 3 August 1616); Dutch- Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th
Centuries, edited by J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, and I. Schöffer 3 vols (The Hague, 1979), III: Homeward-Bound Voyages from
Asia and the Cape to the Netherlands (1597–1795), 16–17; Loth, ‘Armed Incidents and Unpaid Bills’, 713–14; Van Goor, Coen,
281. In 1612, Jan Dirkszoon Lam extracted Samuel Castleton from a sticky situation at St Helena, where the latter was attacked
by a Portuguese carrack while taking in fresh water. Lam, who was in command of three VOC ships, decided to side with the
English and chase the carrack away. Following the incident, Lam sent provisions to Castleton’s ship—the Pearl—and allowed
it to join his own squadron. The Pearl sailed in the company of the three VOC ships as far as the English Channel.
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per ‘Portuguese bahar’ and nutmeg for 10 rials of eight per ‘Portuguese bahar’. In order to ensure a
steady ﬂow of rice deliveries, vessels coming from Bantam, Jakarta or Japara were permitted to
anchor in the roadsteads of Lonthor and Selamon, once they had been searched by the Dutch
and received passports. Natives were not allowed to set out to sea without the prior knowledge of
the Dutch governor of the Banda Islands. VOC personnel were at liberty to search any Bandanese
vessel, and to conﬁscate it if it lacked a proper passport.25
Following the treaty’s signing, Lam gave orders for the establishment of a stone fortress on
the north side of Pulo Way, christened Castle Revenge. Adriaen van der Dussen was appointed
vice-governor of the Banda Islands and captain of the Dutch garrison on Pulo Way. Lam
departed with his ships to the Moluccas, where he and other Councillors of the Indies elected
Dr Laurens Reael (1583–1637) as Governor-General in June 1616. A lawyer by training, Reael
belonged to a powerful Amsterdam regent family. He had sailed for the East in May 1611,
and served as governor of the Moluccas with distinction. Like his predecessor, Reynst, who
had died the previous December, the new Governor-General would soon be forced to pay a
visit to the Banda Islands.26
Lam’s treaty with the Bandanese already started to fray at the edges in early June 1616. Inhabitants
of Pulo Run went over to Nera to kidnap thirty-four men and ﬁfty women originating in Siau, an
island just south of Mindanao. At Reynst’s orders, the Siauese had been forcibly relocated to the
Banda Islands the previous October. It was Van der Dussen’s idea to employ the Siauese in harvest-
ing nutmeg and mace on the island of Nera, which had suffered substantial population losses in the
wake of the Dutch conquest. No wonder, then, that the inhabitants of Pulo Run kidnapped the Siau-
ese as a counter-move. Dirk van de Sande, Governor of the Banda Islands, was not prepared to tear
up Lam’s treaty just yet; doing so would greatly endanger the VOC trading post on Great Banda,
where the Dutch merchants found themselves—as Van der Dussen put it—in ‘enemy territory’.
Still, the latter quickly discovered that, in kidnapping the Siauese, the people of Pulo Run had
enjoyed the tacit cooperation of quite a few inhabitants of Great Banda. The stage was set for another
showdown between the Dutch and the Bandanese, in which the EIC merchant Nathaniel Courthope
would play a crucial role.27
5. Cornelis Dedel and Nathaniel Courthope Debate Dutch and English Claims to the
Banda Islands
Following the Dutch conquest of Pulo Way, Richard Hunt had managed to escape to Makassar
and thence to Bantam, where he could inform Jourdain that the Bandanese were far from
reconciled with the Dutch. Allegedly, eight days before Lam’s attack, the inhabitants of Pulo
Way had ceded their land ‘for the use of the English nation’, and drawn up ‘articles’ (no longer
extant) to protect ‘their liberties’. As physical proof, Hunt brought with him ‘the earth of the
countrye, sticks and stones’, which he claimed to have received from the Bandanese ‘in signe
of possession of the countrye’. Here was a golden opportunity for the EIC to lay down a marker
in the Banda Islands. Jourdain immediately decided to send a new expedition under the com-
mand of Nathaniel Courthope, and appointed Sophonias, Hunt and Thomas Spurway as the
latter’s assistants.28
25Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel, I, 122–24.
26Van Goor, Coen, 116, 187–91; P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, De Eerste Landvoogd Pieter Both (1568–1615), Gouverneur Generaal van Neder-
lands-Indië (1609–1614) (Zutphen, 1987), 50, 55, 99, 102–03, 324–31; Van Goor, Coen, 281–82; Album Advocatorum: De Advocaten
van het Hof van Holland,1560–1811, edited by R. Huijbrechts, S. Scheffers, and J. Scheffers-Hofman (Den Haag,1996), 258; Van der
Aa, Biographisch Woordenboek, XVI,115–22; M.E. van Opstall, ‘Laurens Reael in de Staten-Generaal, het verslag van Reael over de
toestand in Oost-Indië’, in Nederlandse Historische Bronnen, edited by A.C.F. Koch e.a., 10 volumes (Den Haag, 1979–1992), I
(1979), 175–213.
27Bouwstoffen, I, 132–60 (Van der Dussen to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 25 July 1616); Van Goor, Coen, 352–53.
28Jourdain, Journal, 328–29; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 262–67; Clulow, ‘The Art of Claiming’ 32–34; Van Goor, Coen,
291.
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It was Courthope who would become most famous for tenaciously resisting the Dutch claims to
the Banda Islands, and defending the rights of the people of Pulo Run. He was recently lionised in
Milton’s Nathaniel’s Nutmeg, for example. Not much is known about Courthope’s early life. He
enlisted in the service of the EIC in November 1609. Disaster struck two years later: captured by
the Turks, he languished in prison at Aden and Mocha for many months. On regaining his freedom,
he was posted to the EIC trading post on the island of Borneo. At Jourdain’s instigation, he departed
for the Banda Islands in late 1616, commanding the Swan and Defence.29
In his instructions, Jourdain warned Courthope to be circumspect in his dealings with the Ban-
danese—‘a peevish, perverse, difﬁdent, and perﬁdious people’. However, he was also dispatched to
ﬁnd out whether the inhabitants of Pulo Way and Pulo Run still desired to become subjects of
James I, in which case they should be induced
to ratify under their hands and seals the former surrender, if lawfully made; if not, then to make a new surrender
of all or part of such islands as are yet under their own commands and at their own dispose, leaving out those
where the Flemings are possessed and have command.30
Clearly, Jourdain had his doubts about the validity of the ceremony of cession staged by the inhabi-
tants of Pulo Way in March 1616. In staking out claims to overseas trade and territories, the EIC
President in Bantam preferred to play by the European rules of the game. If the VOC enjoyed actual
possession, meaning fortresses and soldiers on the ground, it was not Courthope’s task to challenge
the Dutch claims to Nera and Pulo Way. As noted earlier, actual possession was the most potent
argument in the toolkit of European empire-builders. Jourdain knew that. He sought to rebalance
the power struggle in the Banda Islands by, ﬁrstly, inducing those natives who were still in control
of their own land to surrender their sovereignty through written treaties and, secondly, by invoking
the authority of James I. Written treaties were the lingua franca of European diplomacy—easily
understood and valued highly by the parties involved. At the negotiating tables in London and
The Hague, the EIC directors would be able to make effective use of a document in which the Ban-
danese alienated their sovereignty to James I and declared themselves the king’s subjects. As Jourdain
realised, the Dutch position vis-à-vis the English was notably weaker in Europe than in Asia. The
Dutch Republic was still considered a rebel state in European diplomacy, and depended on its French
and English allies for survival. In return for James’ continuing support at home, surely the Dutch
States General could be persuaded to rein in the VOC in Asia?31
Courthope arrived on Pulo Run in late December 1616, with two ships in tow, the Swan and the
Defence. He immediately entered into negotiations with the Bandanese leaders who were waiting for
him there, in order to renew (as he saw it) the treaty concluded by Hunt. Allegedly, the Bandanese
had surrendered both Pulo Way and Pulo Run to James I, ‘and given ground to the English’ to sym-
bolise this agreement. Moreover, the ﬂag of the King of England had ﬂown over the indigenous
defence works on Pulo Way, while three pieces of ordnance had been ﬁred ‘in token of the Covenant
of the men of Pooloway and Pooloroone’. Yet the new treaty recognised that, as a result of Lam’s
successful invasion, Pulo Way was now in the ‘hands and possession’ of the Dutch. It called upon
James I to recover Pulo Way as a matter of justice—the Bandanese had, after all, ‘absolutely surren-
dred’ it to him. The signatories stressed their indissoluble bond with the English—‘one bond to live
and dye together—’ and offered to send James I a ‘branch of Nutmegs’ as an annual gift. Moreover,
they agreed to sell nutmeg and mace produced on Pulo Way and Pulo Run exclusively to the subjects
of the King of England. They assured Courthope that they made these promises not ‘in madnesse or
29Alsager Vian, ‘Courthope, Nathaniel (d. 1620)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/
view/article/6462> [accessed 6 March 2014].
30EIC Letters, IV, 215–220, particularly 217 (‘The true copy of a Commission for a voyage to Banda’, 29 October 1616 o.s.); Calendar of
State Papers, Colonial Series: East Indies, China and Japan, edited by W. Noel Sainsbury, 8 volumes (London, 1864–1892), II, no.
1171 (Jourdain’s Instructions for Nathaniel Courthope, 29 October 1616 o.s.); Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 262–67; Van
Goor, Coen, 291–92.
31Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 265; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 181; Benton and Straumann, ‘Acquiring Empire by
Law’, 16–17; Van Goor, Coen, 291–92.
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loosely as the breathing of the wind’, but ‘in their hearts’. They requested that James I respect their
property and persons, and prohibit any practices offensive to Islam, such as ‘unreverent usage of
women’ and ‘mayntayning of swine in our country’. Moreover, all inhabitants of Pulo Way and
Pulo Run would enjoy freedom of religion: any Bandanese would be free to convert to Christianity,
while any Englishman who wished to become a Muslim could do so. Still, the document cautioned
against ‘discontent betwixt us and the English’ on this particular point. Finally, eleven orangkayas
from Pulo Way and Pulo Run covenanted with Courthope to surrender the two islands to James
I. It was again noted that the treaty was a renewal of their agreement with Hunt of late March 1616.32
Courthope did not have to wait long for a Dutch response. On Christmas Day, a Dutch vessel
appeared on the horizon. Courthope immediately decided to land his ordnance and erect substantial
fortiﬁcations, establishing one bastion on Pulo Run (Fort Swan) and one on the nearby islet of Nai-
laka (Fort Defence). Three VOC ships nevertheless managed to enter the road of Pulo Run on 13
January 1617 and anchor right next to the Swan and the Defence. Courthope thereupon advised
the Dutch admiral in writing of ‘our possession’ of the island. The recipient was Cornelis Dedel, a
Councillor of the Indies, ﬁscaal (i.e., public prosecutor) and right-hand man of Steven van der
Haghen (1563–1624), the Governor of Ambon.33 Van der Haghen had sent Dedel to the Banda
Islands the moment he heard of Courthope’s arrival there. According to Dedel’s account, he went
on board one of the English ships in order to play for time, but met with ‘burning wicks’ and
‘such choler and passion’ that he did not even get a chance to speak. He was told in no uncertain
terms to leave within two hours. The VOC ships lifted anchor that same evening. Still, Dedel did
not depart without a proper exchange of written ultimatums, i.e., a set of documents that legitimised
armed conﬂict between Europeans. These materials survive in Colonial Ofﬁce 77/1 at the National
Archives in Kew. Signiﬁcantly, the secretary of Castle Nassau—Philip Zuerius—copied, collated and
countersigned the documents. In other words, it was the intention of both parties to, ﬁrstly, docu-
ment in writing that they had done everything by the book and, secondly, send copies to Europe for
possible use in negotiations between the VOC and EIC.34
32Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 181–83 (all quotations); Van Goor, Coen, 293.
33Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 87–88; The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), CO 77/1 f. 96r (council minutes of Natha-
niel Courthope, Sophony Cozucke, Thomas Spurway, John Davye, and John Hinchley, 3/13 Jan. 1617); M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz,
‘Steven van der Haghen (1563–1624)’, in Vier eeuwen varen: kapiteins, kapers, kooplieden en geleerden, edited by L. M. Akveld
(Bussum, 1973), 26–49. Cornelis Dedel travelled with Gerard Reynst to the East Indies. On his arrival in Bantam in November
1614, the Governor-General appointed him as a Councillor of the Indies and ﬁskaal-generaal (head of the judiciary). Dedel
was ﬁrst sent to the Moluccas. In October 1616, he was transferred to Ambon, where he acted as public prosecutor. Reael
had a high opinion of the young man and considered him a potential successor as Governor-General. Sadly, Dedel died in
June 1617, on a voyage from the Banda Islands to Ceram. Reael deplored his early demise; see Geschiedenis van Nederlands
Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 94–95; Bouwstoffen, I, 165 (Reael to the Gentlemen XVII, 22 September 1616); NA, VOC 1064, f. 10v
(Reael to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 2 July 1617). Dedel belonged to an established Dutch regent family which had risen
to prominence in the Utrecht town government in the fourteenth century. Cornelis Willem Joostz Dedel (d. 1574) was a member
of the so-called Veertigraad (Council of Forty) of the town of Leiden, and burgomaster of Leiden in 1573. His son, Willem Joosten
Dedel (1552–1632), held a law degree and served as a VOC director in Delft. The latter sent at least three of his own sons to the
University of Leiden. Nicolaas Dedel (1587–1647) enrolled at the University of Leiden in 1616, and received his appointment as
Professor of Law extraordinarius eight years later. Johan Dedel (d. 1655) was appointed to the Hoge Raad (High Court) of Holland,
Zeeland and West-Friesland, and became its President in 1653. Willem Dedel (d. 1650) served as clerk of the Hoge Raad; see
Van der Aa, Biographisch Woordenboek, IV, 82; Album Advocatorum, edited by Huijbrechts, Scheffers, and Scheffers-Hofman, 107;
W. J. C. Bijleveld, Opmerkingen over de geslachten behandeld in het Nederlands’ Adelsboek (The Hague, 1949), 48.
34Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus V, 88 TNA, CO77/1 f. 96r (council minutes of Nathaniel Courthope, Sophony Cozucke, Thomas
Spurway, John Davye, and John Hinchley, 3/13 Jan. 1617 –copy collated and countersigned by Philip Zuerius: “naer gedane col-
latie mette originele is dese daermede bevonden te accorderen [signed] Phs. Zuerius, 1617”), f. 97r (copy of an ultimatum signed
by Courthope, Cozucke, Spurway, Davye, and Hinchley, 3 /13 Jan. 1617), f. 98v (“Tweede insinuatie bij de Engelschen aende Hol-
landers onder Pouloron gedaen 3/13 January 1616/1617” –i.e. “second English ultimatum given to the Dutch in the roadstead of
Pulo Run, 3/13 January 1616/1617”), f. 101v (“De l’insinuation jaicté par les serviteurs de la Compagnie des Pays Bas aux serviteurs
de la Compagnie Angloise en Banda le 14e du mois de Janvier 1617”), f. 102r (council minutes of Nathaniel Courthope, Sophony
Cozucke, Thomas Spurway, George Muschamp, Robert Hayes, John Davye, John Hinchley, Walter Stasie, Barnard Downes, and
Richard Swannley, 5 /15 Jan. 1617 –copy collated and countersigned by Philip Zuerius: “naer gedane collatie mette originele
is dese daermede bevonden te accorderen [signed] Phs. Zuerius, 1617”), f. 103v (“Copye van sekere resolutie gevonden int
Engelsche aengehaelde Schip de Swaen genaemt”), f. 104r (John Davis to Nathaniel Courthope, 4/14 March 1617 –copy collated
and countersigned by Philip Zuerius: “naer gedane collatie mette principale is dese daermede bevonden te accorderen [signed]
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On 14 January 1617, the Dutch sent Courthope a long list of grievances in French. The English
stood accused of having aided and abetted the VOC’s enemies in the Spice Islands, and of having
purchased nutmeg, mace and cloves in contravention of the delivery contracts. The document sub-
stantiated the serious accusations with various proofs:
1. After the capture of the indigenous defence works on Pulo Way, the Dutch had discovered a
quantity of English arquebuses, powder and artillery, which the English themselves confessed
to having sold to the Bandanese.
2. The previous day, the English had planted an English ﬂag on Pulo Run, constructed two or three
batteries, and compelled three Dutch ships to withdraw from the island’s roadstead within two
hours.
3. The English required restitution of Pulo Way, and threatened to take the island by force in case of
refusal.
4. The English had planted English ﬂags on the island of Rosengain and in the village of Wayer on
Great Banda, and provided rice to the starving inhabitants of Pulo Run, who might otherwise
have ﬂed the country.35
These accusations provide one of the clearest expressions of just how the VOC legitimised its claims
to the Banda Islands. Signiﬁcantly, the Dutch ultimatum made no mention of a surrender of sover-
eignty by the Bandanese. Rather, the ofﬁcial line was that the VOC had entered into exclusive con-
tracts and agreements with the inhabitants of the Spice Islands, who, in return, were obliged to sell
their produce to the company alone, as a quid pro quo for the military and naval assistance that they
received from the VOC—their champion and protector against Portuguese and Spanish ‘tyranny’.
Thus, ‘in the most courteous manner’, the Dutch authorities in the Banda Islands declared that
our nation has taken under its care, and with the assistance of God, effected the defence of several Indian kings
and people against the violence and oppression of the Spaniards, Portuguese, and their adherents, and we are
resolved henceforth to persevere in so laudable a design, according to the contracts and agreements which the
said kings and people, and above all those of the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda in general, have reciprocally
allowed to our nation, not to give up the fruits of the spices or any other [commodity] to any but our own
[people… ].36
As the Dutch authorities saw it, they made a ‘legitimate and reasonable request’ for the English to
leave Pulo Run—taking their two ships, artillery and ammunition with them—and to anchor in
the roadstead of Nera instead. If the English complied, they would be treated ‘as our best friends’.
Should Courthope reject the ultimatum, however, the Dutch authorities would be constrained to
Phs. Zuerius, 1617”), f. 105v (“copye van den brief van Mr. Davids gevange capitain oft Schipper, aende Engelschen op Poulo
Run”), f. 106r (Nathaniel Courthope, Thomas Spurway and John Hinchley to Dedel, 7/17 March 1617 – copy collated and counter-
signed by Philip Zuerius: “naer gedane collatie mette originele is dese daermede bevonden te accorderen [signed] Phs. Zuerius,
1617”), f. 107v (“Antwoorde der Engelschen opte gedaene insinuatie”), f. 108r (Laurens Reael to Nathaniel Courthope and his
companions, 30 March/9 April 1617 – “Copie de la lettre envoier à Nathiel Courthope cum cosijns à Pouleron de 9 d’avril
anno 1617”); Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series III no. 5; NA, VOC 1064 f. 224–225 (Cornelis Dedel to the Amsterdam
VOC directors, 10 May 1617); Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië edited by Stapel, III, 94–95, 102. Reael’s letter to the Amsterdam
VOC Directors of 10 June 1618 suggests that the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies realised the importance of
sending their superiors ofﬁcial, notarised documents regarding English activities in the Spice Islands: ‘Please ﬁnd enclosed several
documents relating to the English, including an ultimatum which should have been sent as part of Advocate Dedel’s dossier [Hier
nevens ghaan eenighe pampieren vande Engelschen ende onder anderen de insinuatie dat bij de stucken moet wesen vande advo-
caat Dedel]’; see NA, VOC 1067, f. 138v. In 1616–17, Philips Zuerius was a member of the Broad Council at Castle Nassau. His
signature can be found in the letter books of the VOC, e.g., NA, VOC 1063, f. 355 (resolution taken by Jan Dirkszoon Lam and
the Broad Council of Castle Nassau, 21 March 1616) and NA, VOC 1064, f. 28–37 (resolutions taken by Laurens Reael and the
Broad Council of Castle Nassau, 9 and 26 April, 4 and 31 May 1617).
35TNA, CO 77/1, f. 100–01 (‘Insinuation des serviteurs de la compagnie du Pais Bas aux serviteurs de la compagnie Angloise en
Banda, le 14.e du mois de Janvier 1617’); Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series III, no. 5; NA, VOC 1064, f. 225 (Dedel to the
Amsterdam VOC Directors, 10 May 1617).
36TNA, CO 77/1, f. 100v-101r; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series III, no. 5. I have used the English translation in the Calendar of
State Papers.
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use all means possible, including armed force, to maintain the contracts with the Bandanese and
compel the English to withdraw. Dedel did not make idle threats. He sent a pinnace to take sound-
ings around Nailaka.37
Courthope reconvened his council the next day, and decided to land another seven pieces of ord-
nance. In case of a Dutch attack, armed force would be used ‘in defence of our right and ourselves’.
Still, the lack of fresh water on Pulo Run—not to mention a fast-diminishing supply of victuals—
posed a far bigger threat to the well-being of the English and the Bandanese. A small island to
start with, most of the area under cultivation was given over to the nutmeg tree. The inhabitants
depended for their survival on food imports from other islands—rice from Java, for example, and
sago from Ceram and Buru (near Ambon). Since the Dutch were the dominant maritime power,
they effectively controlled the food supply. In times of war, they could simply let their native enemies
starve to death.38
The lack of fresh water made itself felt ﬁrst. On 28 January 1617, John Davis took the Swan to
Great Banda in order to ﬁll its water casks. In addition, he received from disaffected Bandanese
the ‘surrender’ of the village of Wayer and the island of Rosengain. Returning to Pulo Run, Davis
had the misfortune to encounter the wily Dedel in the Morgensterre. Dedel ﬁrst gave chase to the
Swan and then attacked her. According to Master Davis, ‘we fought almost board and board an
hour and a half till they had killed ﬁve men, maimed three, and hurt eight’. There were no dead
or wounded men aboard Dedel’s ship. The Swan was towed in triumph to the roadstead of Nera.
Its crewmembers were imprisoned in Castle Nassau. As Dedel wrote to the VOC directors, he
had no qualms about attacking the Swan. The English had received plenty of warnings and ulti-
matums in the past.39
At the end of February, Courthope sent one of his most trusted men, Robert Hayes, to Castle Nas-
sau to inquire into Dedel’s reasons for capturing the Swan. According to Courthope’s journal, the
English were accused of being little more than free riders in the Spice Islands, uninvolved observers
who took no responsibility for the war against Iberian ‘tyranny’. The authorities at Castle Nassau
expected the Dutch and English governments to resolve the conﬂicts between the EIC and VOC
before long. Still, they would do their best to capture the Defence and arrest any Englishman
found in Wayer and on Rosengain. Hayes received a written message to the effect ‘that the wrongs
we offered [the Dutch] could no longer be indured’. Further pressure was put on Courthope in the
middle of March, when an envoy from Castle Nassau arrived at Pulo Run, carrying John Davis’ letter.
According to the Master of the Swan, Courthope was best advised to enter into negotiations with the
Dutch and avoid any more bloodshed. Since a merger of the VOC and the EIC seemed to be in the
ofﬁng, he urged Courthope to anchor the Defence in the roadstead of Nera and ‘let the law end it at
home’. By his own admission, he and the other surviving crewmembers of the Swan were treated well
by the authorities at Castle Nassau.40
Courthope would have none of this. He sought to spin out the proceedings as much as possible,
for the sake of ‘our better fortiﬁcation’. Thus he replied to Dedel that he could not accept the Dutch
offer until he had an opportunity to speak with the Swan’s surviving crewmembers. A Bandanese
refugee from Nera reliably informed him that the ship’s entire crew had been murdered in cold
blood. How could he even be certain that Master Davis’ communication was a ‘true letter’? As for
Dedel claiming to have authorisation to ‘beate us of from Poolaroone’, he had been commissioned
to ‘maintain the King’s Majesty’s right of England’, and fortify the island ‘against all nations’. Dedel’s
reaction was one of unbelief: he wrote to the VOC directors that he had wished to resolve the affair
peacefully, but received ‘an absurd answer’ from Courthope, ‘as you can tell from the enclosed
37TNA, CO 77/1, f. 101r; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, III, no. 5; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 88–89.
38TNA, CO 77/1, f. 101v, 102r, 103v; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, III, no. 5; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 88–89.
39TNA, CO 77/1, f. 104r; Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, III, no. 5; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 88–89; NA, VOC 1064, f.
225
40TNA, CO 77/1, f. 104r; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 88-89; NA, VOC 1064, f. 226 (Dedel to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 10
May 1617).
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documents’. Still, another Dutch envoy was sent to Pulo Run, carrying Dedel’s letter and a second
communication from Master Davis, along with the latter’s ‘boy’. Courthope noted with satisfaction
in his journal that he and his men on Pulo Run were now ‘almost readie for them’. On 21 March, he
returned an ‘absolute answer’, saying that he had no intention whatsoever to leave Pulo Run.41
Three days later, Courthope and his council decided to bring all provisions ashore and to beach
the leaky Defence, which had lost two anchors already. On 30 March, the ship lost her moorings
again and drifted towards Great Banda. The twenty crewmembers made a virtue out of necessity:
they sailed into the roadstead of Nera and surrendered to the authorities at Castle Nassau. According
to Purchas, the editor of Courthope’s journal, the ship had been betrayed ‘by perﬁdious knaves’.
Courthope may have believed that as well. It was a stroke of luck for the Dutch, of course. Dedel
had left the roadstead of Nera in an attempt to reach Pulo Run, but ended up in Ambon instead,
largely as a result of adverse currents and winds. It was during his absence from the Banda Islands
that the Defence fell into Dutch hands. The ship and its crew provided crucial information about
Courthope’s defences at Pulo Run. Dedel estimated that twenty-two or twenty-three cannons had
been landed from the Swan and the Defence and that ﬁfty or sixty Englishmen remained on the
island, which, consequently, could only be attacked ‘with iron ﬁsts’. Was Courthope really in a strong
position, though? Having lost two ships, how was he now going to defend Pulo Run from the Dutch
or, indeed, obtain fresh water and food supplies for the men remaining on the island?42
6. Laurens Reael and Cornelis Dedel Construct a Legal Basis for the VOC Monopoly
of the Spice Trade
In early April 1617, Reael arrived on Pulo Way. He was alive to the threat that the EIC posed to the
incipient VOC monopoly of the spice trade. As Governor of the Molucccas, he had successfully used
a combination of blandishments, veiled threats and a show of force to forestall any trade between the
inhabitants of the island of Matjan and Captain John Saris in March and April 1613, for example. As
Governor-General, he did not feel that, in dealing with the English, he received much guidance or
backing from the Gentlemen XVII, the VOC’s highest governing board. In late July 1616, he
wrote to the Gentlemen XVII to conﬁrm that he had received their letters of 18 March and 29
April 1615, containing detailed accounts of the negotiations between the VOC and the EIC in
The Hague that spring. Reael complained that the directors gave contradictory advice on how to
deal with the English in the Spice Islands. The enclosed sample ultimatum was simply not ﬁt for pur-
pose. As Reael noted, the directors apparently assumed—or wished to assume—that the English
resorted to violence in order to obtain trade in the Spice Islands. If that were the case, the VOC
would indeed be entitled to use armed force in defence of its indigenous allies. Ever the jurist,
Reael pointed out that he did not need authorisation from the directors to prevent an attack or
‘repel violence with violence [vim vis repellere]’. This was a right which ‘nature itself teaches us to
use’. However, the situation in the Spice Islands was quite different. The inhabitants of the Spice
Islands traded with the English of their own free will. EIC interloping had become an enormous nui-
sance: it diverted valuable resources from the war against the Spanish and the Portuguese, and caused
growing feelings of resentment towards the VOC. The English merchants never failed to remind the
natives how ‘their free trade was now shackled by the Dutch and that, ipso facto, they had completely
lost their liberty’.43
41TNA, CO 77/1, f. 106r; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 88-89; NA, VOC 1064, f. 226.
42Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 90; NA, VOC 1064, f. 227 (Dedel to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 10 May 1617).
43NA, VOC 1064 f. 1r-2v (Reael to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617); Van Ittersum, Proﬁt and Principle 436–446;
Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1610–1638, edited by
W.Ph. Coolhaas, RGP series 104 (The Hague, 1960) 65–66 (Reael to the Gentlemen XVII, 18 July 1616 –all quotations taken from
this source); NA, VOC 312 f. 148– 157(Gentlemen XVII to Governor-General Reynst and the Councillors of the Indies, 30 April 1615
–includes a draft ultimatum on f. 156–157); Van Goor, Coen, 280–281
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 D
un
de
e] 
at 
02
:54
 31
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
Reael’s need for greater clarity from the directors was met when he reached Castle Victoria at
Ambon in early March 1617. Steven van der Haghen showed him a letter from the Gentlemen
XVII of 10 December 1615, instructing the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies
‘to maintain and assure the trade in the Spice Islands with armed force, without any further simu-
lation or connivance’. Enclosed was yet another sample ultimatum, according to which ‘the Chinese,
Javanese, Cling and English’ should be given ‘friendly warning and advertisement’ upon their arrival
in the Spice Islands. The threat of force was thinly veiled. The directors gave explicit orders for the
natives to be ‘rigorously punished’ for trading with ‘foreign nations’ in contravention of the contracts
concluded with the VOC. The Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies received per-
mission to use armed force against ‘those who support the Indians in their wantonness’ or who
sought ‘to harm the Indians because of a refusal to trade’—that old canard of the Gentlemen
XVII. Still, their letter provided Reael with the legal backing he craved in order to take decisive action
against the English in the Banda Islands. On 6 March 1617, he and the Councillors of the Indies,
including Van der Haghen and Dedel, signed a resolution to put the directors’ orders into immediate
effect.44
That same month, both Dedel and Jaspar Janssen, Governor of Ambon and Councillor of the
Indies, tried to attack the English positions at Pulo Run, but failed miserably. Each was in command
of a squadron of three warships. Due to contrary winds and currents, neither squadron got near the
island, however—Janssen and his ships drifted as much as ‘50 or 60 miles’ east of the archipelago.
Arguably, these setbacks left Reael no choice but to cross over to the Banda Islands himself. In
order to expedite matters, he decided to travel light and leave ‘his papers’ behind. When he arrived
at Pulo Way on 3 April 1617, he had a sizeable maritime force at his disposal. The squadrons com-
manded by Dedel and Janssen lay at anchor in the roadstead of Nera, along with the Defence. The
Dutch ship Hope reached the roadstead of Nera the following day, as did a Portuguese pinnace, cap-
tured by the Dutch in the Moluccas. Why did the Governor-General and the Councillors of the
Indies decide to negotiate with Courthope and the Bandanese, rather than lead an all-out assault
on Pulo Run?45
Reael and Dedel gave their reasons in letters addressed to the Amsterdam-based directors of the
VOC on 10 May 1617. According to Dedel, three hundred and ﬁfty soldiers at most could be spared
from garrison duty in the Banda Islands for an expeditionary force against Pulo Run. In order to put
them ashore on the island, Dutch ships would have to anchor close to Run Village, a roadstead
within range of the three powerful English batteries of Fort Swan. Moreover, Dedel did not doubt
that any roads and paths on Pulo Run would be full of caltrops. It would take many days for the
soldiers to clear these, and capture the English batteries. In view of the strong sea currents, it
would also be a risky undertaking to supply victuals and drinking water to an expeditionary force
on Pulo Run.46
There were other considerations as well. On Reael’s arrival, the Bandanese had presented them-
selves on the beach with white ﬂags in their hands, requesting peace negotiations. The armed conﬂict
with the Dutch had reduced them to extreme poverty and want. The maritime blockade of the Banda
Islands, a tried and tested method in naval warfare in Europe, had been extremely effective: very little
sago and rice had reached the Bandanese in the previous ten months. Dedel commented that ‘we
have seen many [Bandanese] looking like skeletons because of the famine’.47 Prior to Courthope’s
arrival, the inhabitants of Pulo Run had even removed the pits from ‘their coconut trees [sago
palms?]’ and, in their despair, made preparations to leave the island. Indeed, had the armed conﬂict
continued, Reael did not doubt that the entire population of the Banda Islands would have ﬂed else-
where. Many starving Bandanese had already relocated to the island of Ceram (near Ambon), a place
44NA, VOC 1064, f. 24–25 (resolution of 6 March 1617), VOC 312, f. 286 (Gentlemen XVII to Steven van der Haghen, 10 December
1615); Van Goor, Coen, 353–54. The VOC directors used the term ‘Cling’ to denote merchants from the Indian subcontinent.
45NA, VOC 1064 f. 1r-2v
46NA, VOC 1064 f. 228v (Dedel to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617)
47NA, VOC 1064 f. 227v (Dedel to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617)
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where they were accustomed to go with their proas in order to obtain sago and rice from Javanese
traders. Since the VOC only cared about the bottom line, it would ‘be rather unproductive to possess
a land without people’. The expertise of the Bandanese was simply indispensable for harvesting
spices. The Governor-General admitted that their ‘faithless, extreme fury’ irritated him—but he
saw no alternative to concluding yet another peace treaty. As Dedel noted, how could the Outhoorn
otherwise leave for Bantam in July 1617 with a cargo of mace and nutmeg?48
Both Reael and Dedel deemed the experiment to repopulate the island of Nera with the inhabi-
tants of Siau to be a complete disaster. In Reael’s view, it was hardly surprising that the Bandanese
should have ‘seduced’ the inhabitants of Siau with ‘great promises’, and carried them away from Nera
in June 1616. The Bandanese knew full well ‘how disadvantageous it would be for themselves if spices
could be harvested without their help’. Nor could one blame the inhabitants of Siau, who had been
kidnapped by the VOC ﬁrst, tearing them away from their ‘wives, children, land and king’. A recent
eruption of the Gunung Api, which had covered Nera in volcanic ash, had not helped either. While
the Dutch busied themselves with their repopulation experiments, the nutmeg trees on the islands of
Nera and Pulo Way simply went untended, weeds springing up everywhere. According to Reael, so
few knowledgeable workers were available on Pulo Way that nutmeg and mace could be harvested
from only a quarter of the trees.49
As noted earlier, the VOC directors had given explicit permission for the use of force against
European competitors in the Spice Islands in their letter of 10 December 1615. Both Dedel and
Reael fully endorsed this policy change, and wished the directors had acted earlier, ‘for then it
would not have come to this’. However, Reael did not wish to take action against ‘Cling, Malay, Java-
nese and other Asian merchants’. Squeezed by the Spanish and the English, the VOC should avoid
creating more enemies in the Spice Islands. There was a strong legal case against the exclusion of
Asian merchants. Reael told the directors in no uncertain terms that we ‘do not have that kind of
sovereignty here’. Speaking as a former Governor of the Moluccas, he explained that all islands
and areas of signal importance for the spice trade were subject to ‘the King [of Ternate] and his
favoured orangkayas’, who recognised ‘our suzerainty’ only out of courtesy—‘since we took them
into our protection, they are bound to sell their cloves to us in return’. However, no other servitude
had ever been imposed upon them, let alone discussed with them. Unless reduced to the greatest
misery, they would never consent to the VOC de facto banning Asian merchants from the Spice
Islands, certainly not co-religionists. There were other considerations. The income of the ‘kings
and lords of these countries’ was crucially dependent on harbour tax, anchorage fees, and other
duties related to the spice trade. The common people beneﬁted from the visits of Asian merchants
as well. The latter offered a wide variety of products at very cheap prices—‘thousands of small items,
which we do not import’. In sum, the VOC should do everything in its power to exclude European
competitors from the Spice Islands, but leave Asian merchants alone.50
Dedel, a law graduate like Reael, made similar points in his letter to the VOC directors. It would
be ‘very dangerous’—and in contravention of natural law—to suddenly prohibit all trade and com-
munication between the inhabitants of the Spice Islands and ‘other Indian nations’. The natives only
had to point to the written texts of ‘our contracts’, which contained no prohibitions to this effect.
Moreover, they could obtain their necessities from Asian merchants in far greater variety and at
cheaper prices than anything offered by the VOC. Indeed, Dedel doubted that the VOC would be
able to fulﬁl its obligations to the Bandanese with whom Reael had just concluded a new peace treaty.
The Aeolus, coming from India with textiles, had been shipwrecked near the Sunda Straits. Few VOC
vessels laden with rice had reached the Spice Islands that spring, due to a sudden change in the mon-
soon winds. Moreover, ‘so sweet is the notion to be able to trade freely with all the world that [the
48NA, VOC 1064 f. 227r, 229r (Dedel to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617); Generale missiven I 71–72 (Reael to the
Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617); NA, VOC 1064 f. 10r (Reael to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617).
49Generale missiven, I, 71–73 (Reael to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617); NA, VOC 1064 f. 227r; Van Goor, Coen
352–353
50Generale missiven I, 72–73.
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natives] will gladly suffer great dangers for the sake of this’. Dedel’s words were prophetic: civil wars
would not just ravage the Banda Islands, but also Hitu and Ceram (near Ambon) in the ﬁrst half of
the seventeenth century, all because of the VOC’s determination to monopolise the spice trade.51
What were the principal clauses of the peace treaty of 30 April 1617, which Reael concluded with
the inhabitants of the islands of Great Banda and Rosengain? First of all, it was afﬁrmed that all the
provisions of the peace treaty of May 1616 remained in force, unless noted otherwise. The main
difference between the two treaties was that the Bandanese were now instructed to refuse anchorage
to the English and other foreigners from Europe. This was clearly aimed at Courthope and his crew
at Pulo Run. As stipulated in the 1616 peace treaty, Javanese junks were still permitted to anchor in
the roadstead of Nera or in sight of the town of Selamon on the island of Great Banda, provided they
ﬁrst obtained passports from the Dutch. All trade and communication with the inhabitants of Pulo
Run was suspended for the duration of the war. The Bandanese were forbidden to, ﬁrst, visit Pulo
Run ‘to trade in nutmeg, mace or any other goods’, second, support its inhabitants with ‘people,
ammunition, food stuffs and anything else’, and, third, allow them access to any of the other
Banda islands. This meant that Bandanese navigation was conﬁned within strict geographical limits.
No Bandanese were allowed to sail west of Pulo Way for the duration of the war. In his letter to the
VOC directors of 10 May 1617, Reael was not terribly hopeful that the new treaty would last any
longer than the previous one. In his view, the Bandanese made promises that they would ﬁnd it
impossible to keep. He would leave orders for the Dutch forces in the Banda Islands to practise
restraint, however, and thus ‘obtain as many fruits from the country as possible, in order that
Your Honours’ excessive costs be defrayed by means of rich cargoes’. Of course, Reael would rather
have included Pulo Run in the new peace treaty. In April 1617, he had negotiated for three weeks
with Courthope, before reaching out to the inhabitants of Rosengain and Great Banda. What had
Reael hoped to achieve in his negotiations with Courthope and how did he handle it?52
7. Laurens Reael and Nathaniel Courthope Debate Dutch and English Claims to the
Banda Islands
The negotiations between Courthope and Reael have left a long paper trail in the National Archives
in Kew, England, courtesy of Philip Zuerius, Reael’s private secretary. Zuerius prepared two identical
sets of copies—for one for the Dutch, one for the English—of all the documents exchanged between
the two parties, copies which he collated and notarised himself. Since the VOC was the dominant
naval and military power in the Banda Islands and there was little possibility of inﬂicting a direct
defeat, Courthope and his employers had every incentive to carefully preserve such materials.
One day, these might prove useful at the conference tables back in Europe. No wonder, then, that
many original documents were reproduced in Purchas His Pilgrimes. Still, there is an element of
luck involved in the survival of Zuerius’ copies at the National Archives in Kew. Reael’s letter of
May 1617 indicates that he enclosed the other set of copies prepared by Zuerius. The Governor-Gen-
eral realised that it was just as important for the VOC directors to receive the correct documentation.
While his letter is extant at the National Archives in The Hague, the enclosures are not. We have no
way of knowing what went wrong, or where or when—sufﬁce it to say that not many historians, not
even Sir William Foster (1863–1951), have looked at Zuerius’ copies in the National Archives in Kew.
It is far easier to cite Purchas his Pilgrimes, after all. Yet Zuerius’ copies, along with the letters of Reael
and Dedel, are indispensable for a balanced assessment of what happened in the Banda Islands four
hundred years ago.53
51NA, VOC 1064 f. 223r-v, 228r (Dedel to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617); Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen 21–
35; Gerrit Knaap, `Kora-kora en kruitdamp: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in oorlog en vrede in Ambon’ in De Verenigde
Oost-Indische Compagnie Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie, edited by Knaap and Teitler 257–279.
52Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel, I, 128–30; NA, VOC 1064, f. 3r–v (Reael to the Amsterdam
Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617) and f. 228r (Dedel to the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, 10 May 1617).
53See footnote 34 above; NA, VOC 1064 f. 3v; Stern, The Company-State viii, 71, 107.
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On 2 April 1617, Courthope dispatched an English messenger to Nera, in order to demand the
return of the Defence. The messenger did not get any further than Great Banda, where peace nego-
tiations were underway between the Bandanese and the Dutch. Two days later, Reael sent a repre-
sentative to Pulo Run with a proposal for a meeting. Initially, Courthope turned his offer down for
fear of ‘treacherie’. At the same time, he received another letter from John Davis, the unlucky Master
of the Swan imprisoned at Castle Nassau. The letter was quoted selectively in Purchas His Pilgrimes,
and for good reason. There were deep divisions among the English in the Banda Islands. ‘If I lose any
more men by your arrogance’, so Davis wrote, ‘as here I have lost by sicknesse already, their lives and
blouds shall rest upon your heads and your faction’. He clearly blamed Courthope for the fact that
the crews of the Swan and Defence still languished in prison. He warned that the Dutch were auth-
orised to use force against the English. To prevent further bloodshed, he was desperate for an agree-
ment with Reael—‘let the Law decide between our Masters and theirs’. In addition, he cautioned
Courthope against putting too much trust in his native allies. He pointed out that the ‘treacherous
Bandanese’ were already negotiating a peace treaty with the Dutch on the island of Great Banda, ‘so
that they may have time to cut your throats’. Although afterwards Davis’ letter was dismissed by
Courthope (and consequently by Purchas) as little more than Dutch propaganda, at the time it
did the trick of persuading him to get in touch with Reael. Courthope’s letter has not survived,
but Reael’s reply has.54
In his letter of 9 April 1617, Reael expressed his astonishment at the ‘very unworthy proceedings’
of the English, who had received plenty of warnings and ultimatums from the Dutch. Notwithstand-
ing the ‘strict alliance’ and ‘good understanding’ between the Dutch States General and the English
Crown, ‘the law of nature [droict de nature]’ compelled VOC servants to resist English interloping in
the Spice Islands. Reael begged Courthope to reconsider his position ‘in order to avoid the further
effusion of blood’. Under no circumstance could the Dutch allow other nations to enjoy a trade
that they had acquired in the Spice Islands at so great an expense, and to the exclusion of all others.
In accordance with the directors’ instructions, the Governor-General was ready to forcibly drive the
English out of the Banda Islands. He protested before God and the world to be innocent of any ‘evil
or inconvenience’, having desired to maintain a ‘strict friendship’ with the English. Still, he wished to
ﬁnd a solution through negotiations if at all possible. Three days later, Courthope replied that he
would cross over to Nera together with Spurway if Reael sent him two ‘pledges’. The Governor-Gen-
eral agreed to this condition. On 16 April, a Dutch galley arrived at Pulo Run with two Dutch hos-
tages, who remained on the island for the duration of the talks. The galley returned to Castle Nassau
with Courthope and Spurway on board.55
In the letter’s postscript, Reael had inquired after the whereabouts of assistant merchant Chris-
topher van Laar, who had been sent to Pulo Run as a messenger on a previous occasion. Reael
warned Courthope not to detain Van Laar against ‘the law of nations [le droict commun des
gens]’. The young man was indeed at Pulo Run. Complaining about bad treatment by his superiors
at Castle Nassau, Van Laar decided to offer his services to the English instead. He even proposed to
take a force of ﬁfty armed men to Pulo Way and capture the Dutch fortress there. Spurway did not
trust him, however. He explained to Van Laar that the English had no commission to retake Pulo
Way ‘by force of Armes’. Since the English enjoyed the island’s ‘ﬁrst possession and surrender’,
he was conﬁdent, however, that they would receive it back ‘by right of Law and Justice’, presumably
as part of a diplomatic agreement in Europe. To his annoyance, Van Laar enjoyed Courthope’s com-
plete conﬁdence, and could roam freely over Pulo Run, ‘so that he saw all our fortiﬁcations’. Spurway
took the Dutchman with him when, at Courthope’s behest, he set sail for Bantam in a Bandanese
proa in late April. The plan was to seek much-needed assistance from the English factory at Bantam
54Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, IV, 521, V, 90–91.
55TNA, CO 77/1, f. 108r–v (Reael to Courthope, 30 March/9 April 1617) and 108v (Courthope to Reael, 2/12 April 1617); Purchas,
Hakluytus Posthumus, IV, 522, V, 91; EIC Letters, V, 349 (Nathaniel Courthope and Thomas Spurway to the English President at
Bantam, 15 April 1617 o.s.).
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and put Van Laar on the ﬁrst ship bound for England. It did not work out that way. George Ball,
interim head of the English factory, had no intention of sending a relief force to the Banda Islands.
After two months in Bantam, Van Laar switched sides again and ﬂed to the Dutch trading post there.
Spurway vented his anger and disappointment in a letter to the EIC directors of November 1617.
Had Van Laar been sent to England, he could have acted as a star witness in negotiations with
the VOC, which Spurway equated with a ‘prosequution in Law’. Arguably, this was how VOC
and EIC servants understood a process of negotiation between European powers. When Reael
and Courthope sat down for talks at Castle Nassau on 17 April 1617, the companies’ various natural
law claims to the Banda Islands were uppermost in their minds.56
The conversation between Courthope and Reael was far from friendly. Grievances were aired on
both sides. The Dutch complained about English ‘abuses’. For example, Sir Henry Middleton was
alleged to have ﬂown the Dutch ﬂag on The Trade’s Increase when he turned pirate in the Arabian
and Red Seas in 1611/12. Courthope, who had served on The Trade’s Increase, denounced the accu-
sation as a complete and utter lie. ‘Sir Henrie was a Gentleman that much scorned to weare the Hol-
lands colours’. Courthope gave as good as he got and asked his hosts to exhibit the King’s letter
authorising them ‘to take any English to the Eastward of the Selebes’ [i.e., modern-day Sulawesi].
If the Dutch could produce it, he would be happy to vacate Pulo Run. But, of course, ‘they could
shew no such Letter’. Next it was the turn of Reael to use many ‘perswasions’ to get Courthope to
leave Pulo Run, all to no avail. Courthope declared that he had no intention of giving up ‘that
right which I am able to hold’ and thus turning ‘Traitor unto my King and Country’. Nor did he
wish to betray the Bandanese who had surrendered their land to James I. Apparently, the Gover-
nor-General became so irritated at Courthope’s intransigence that he ‘threw his Hat on the ground,
and pulled his Beard for anger’. At the suggestion of Spurway, who was eager to get out of Castle
Nassau, Courthope declared that he could not take any decisions on his own, but had to report
back to his council at Pulo Run. He promised to send ‘an absolute answer’ before long. Yet Reael
insisted that Courthope sign a written document prior to his departure, acknowledging that he
had been offered the Swan and the Defence, along with their cargoes and crews, on the condition
that he remove his artillery from Pulo Run and leave the Banda archipelago with all his people.
According to Spurway, Courthope had not signed the document—yet the copy prepared by Zuerius
suggests that he had.57
Reael had one more ace up his sleeve. In the expectation that Courthope would heed the advice of a
countryman, he arranged for Master Davis to be brought into the room. The prisoner proceeded to
have ‘much discourse’ with Courthope, but not in the manner Reael would have wished. Courthope
reiterated his offer to vacate Pulo Run if the Dutch could show him a commission of James I, authoris-
ing the capture of English ships east of Celebes. Master Davis, ‘perswaded that it was true’, considered
Courthope’s offer to be very reasonable, only to discover that Reael could not produce the relevant
documentation. Not to be outdone, the Dutch questioned the validity of the surrender of Pulo Run
to King James, citing the prior treaty of May 1616 concluded by Lam. Courthope demanded to see
the evidence, i.e., ‘a true surrender made from the country people to them’. If we may believe the Eng-
lishman, his Dutch interlocutors were again unable to come up with anything—‘so plainly I saw it was
but words’. This seems strange. The treaties between the VOC and the Bandanese are extant at the
Dutch National Archives in The Hague in the so-called Contractboeken. It is hard to imagine that
there were no notarised, authenticated copies at hand in Castle Nassau—unless, of course, Reael
had left them behind at Ambon, along with his other papers. At this point in the negotiations,
Courthope made a clever counter move. If the Dutch would return the Defence ‘to carry my goods
away and part of my ordnance’, he would be content for the Dutch and English factories at Bantam
56TNA, CO 77/1, 108r–v; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, IV, 526–28; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 269–70.
57TNA, CO 77/1 f. 109r (Copy of Reael’s offer, signed by Nathaniel Courthope on 7/17 April, 1617); Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, IV,
522-24 (all quotations taken from this source); EIC Letters, V, 349–50 (Courthope and Thomas Spurway to the English President at
Bantam, 15 April 1617 o.s.); Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 194–97.
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to settle their differences through negotiations, provided Pulo Runwould not be attacked in themean-
time. Should the factories at Bantam fail to arrive at a negotiated settlement, the Dutch would be at
liberty ‘to do their best against us’ when the western monsoon came around again. It is clear from
Courthope’s letter to the English President at Bantam of 25 April 1617 that he expected an English
relief force to reach the Banda Islands at that time aswell. Not surprisingly, Reael declinedCourthope’s
offer.Meanwhile,Master Davis burst out ‘in great furie’ against his Dutch hosts, who, he now believed,
had told him ‘nothing but lies’. He complained about the ill treatment—‘hard usuage’ and ‘want of
food, and clothing’—that he and his crew had received at Castle Nassau. Moreover, they resented
being used by the Dutch as bargaining chips in the negotiations with Courthope. Master Davis
declared he would be happy to remain a prisoner indeﬁnitely if it meant that Courthope could keep
Pulo Run out of Dutch hands. This outcome was not at all what Reael had expected fromDavis’meet-
ing with Courthope. Face-to-face negotiations were at an end.58
Courthope and Spurway safely returned to Pulo Run, where they released the Dutch hostages.
They then replied in writing to Reael’s presentation, rejecting all of his demands. They had sworn
an oath of allegiance, and were duty-bound to maintain the right of the EIC and James I, ‘our Sou-
veraignie Lord’. Nor could they betray the inhabitants of Pulo Run, ‘who have surrendred their
islandts and themselves unto his Majesty of England’. Indeed, if the Bandanese suspected any kind
of double-dealing by the English, the situation could become very dangerous very quickly, the Ban-
danese ‘being the stronger’. Finally, Courthope and Spurway repeated the proposal already tabled at
Castle Nassau: they asked Reael to return theDefence, allow them to transport their goods to Bantam,
and give a promise in writing not to attack Pulo Run until its status had been determined by means of
negotiations ‘in England or Bantam’. The reply was delivered to Castle Nassau on 21 April 1617.59
Reael discussed the reply with the Councillors of the Indies and issued an ultimatum to
Courthope and Spurway that same day. Dedel’s letter to the VOC directors gives a good insight
into the deliberations at Castle Nassau. Dedel dismissed the English proposals as ‘totally absurd’.
Why should Reael release the Defence, allow mace and nutmeg to be shipped to the English factory
at Bantam, and wait for Pulo Run’s status to be decided ‘in Bantam or the fatherland’, while the Eng-
lish would remain ‘in possession of the aforesaid island’? As Dedel knew very well, actual possession
usually tipped the scales in any disputes over European claims to overseas territories. The longer
Courthope stayed in undisturbed possession of Pulo Run, the stronger the English case would
become in negotiations back in Europe. It was imperative for Reael to assert the Dutch claim to
the island, in word as well as in deed.60
The ultimatum of 21 April should be seen in this context. Reael ﬁrst repeated the terms of his
presentation four days earlier, but then responded to Courthope’s letter. The fact that the English-
man set great store by his alliance with the Bandanese puzzled the Governor-General. Surely, this
new alliance could not be more important than ‘the ancient alliance and confederation between
the Crown of England and the United Provinces’? Moreover, it had been concluded without any
authorisation from James I, ‘against all right’, and with ‘inﬁdel moors’, enemies of the Dutch, yet
bound to the latter ‘by contract’. Courthope and his men were given three days to make up their
minds. If they persisted in aiding the inhabitants of Pulo Run, Reael protested before God and
58Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, IV, 524 and EIC Letters, V, 349–50 (all quotations from these two sources); NA, VOC 1064 f. 227v
(Cornelis Dedel to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 10 May 1617). Most of the Contractboeken (NA, VOC 4777–4783) are bulky,
bound volumes of collated, notarised copies of the VOC’s treaties and contracts with Asian rulers and peoples. As a rule of
thumb, the copies contained in these Contractboeken were produced at Batavia Castle (modern-day Jakarta) in the second
half of the seventeenth century or later. Clearly, the originals were kept there as well. VOC 4778 is a collection of unbound copies
of contracts and treaties with indigenous rulers and peoples that includes materials from the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century,
such as Hoen’s treaty with the Bandanese of August 1609. It is not clear where the originals were kept prior to the construction of
Batavia Castle in 1618. Thanks to Coen, Batavia Castle quickly became the undisputed centre of Dutch power in the East Indies,
and would remain so for centuries to come. The treaty texts found in the Contractboeken form the basis of the twentieth-century
source edition, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel.
59TNA, CO 77/1 f. 109r-v (copy, Nathaniel Courthope and Thomas Spurway to Laurens Reael, 10 April 1617 o.s.); NA, VOC 1064 f.
227v.
60NA, VOC1064, f. 227v.
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the world that he would be innocent of any effusion of blood that might ensue. He also demanded the
return of Christopher van Laar.61
Courthope reacted to the ultimatum by quickly dispatching Van Laar and Spurway to Bantam.
The pair safely arrived there in early June. Courthope’s side of the story thus reached George Ball
and eventually the EIC directors in London. The second Bandanese proa that Courthope sent to Ban-
tam was not so lucky. She hit ‘rockie ground’ near the island of Buton. Although the crew got ashore,
her valuable cargo of mace—which would have been worth ﬁve thousand pounds sterling in England
—disappeared into the sea.62
Once he had issued the ultimatum, Reael met again with the Councillors of the Indies in order to
discuss how best to proceed. The Dutch found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Was it better to
continue the war with the Bandanese or to make a separate peace treaty with the inhabitants of Great
Banda and Rosengain? Dedel examined the arguments for and against in his letter to the VOC direc-
tors of early May 1617. He realised, for example that the English and the native inhabitants of Pulo
Run might proﬁt surreptitiously from a peace treaty with Great Banda and Rosengain. What could
prevent the inhabitants of Great Banda and Rosengain from selling spices to the English at Pulo Run
or from sending over foodstuffs and reinforcements? There was an important counter argument,
however. If the state of war continued, the VOC would not obtain any spices whatsoever. This
clinched the argument. Of course, Reael did try to make the new peace treaty as watertight as poss-
ible, by prohibiting all trade and communication with Pulo Run—yet he decided against attacking
the island during the eastern monsoon. There were not enough soldiers to both launch a successful
invasion of Pulo Run and keep the garrisons elsewhere at full strength. Moreover, the island’s geogra-
phy and the batteries established by the English made it difﬁcult to safely land an expeditionary force
and send in sufﬁcient reinforcements and supplies. Nor was Pulo Run worth the effort in Dedel’s
view. Since it produced few spices, it could only be of service to the English as a gateway to the
rest of the Banda Islands. Dedel estimated that there were ﬁfty or sixty armed men left on the island,
albeit ‘with little order and authority’. As far as Dedel could tell, the natives were in charge of the
English batteries. Moreover, the rainy season was at hand. The food supplies that Courthope had
brought from Bantam would run out at some point. Dedel concluded that the English could expect
‘not a little trouble and inconvenience’ in the coming months.63
Although Reael and Dedel prioritised European rules of engagement in defending the VOC’s claim
to the Banda Islands, they were quite willing to employ native ceremonies and structures of authority
to buttress their arguments. Dedel explained in his letter to the VOC directors that, when hostilities
broke out again in 1616, the Bandanese had appealed to Sultan Mudaffar of Ternate for his interces-
sion. Their letter had reached Ternate through the good ofﬁces of Cimelaha Sabadin, the Sultan’s gov-
ernor at Ceram (near Ambon). As John Villiers notes, the rulers of Ternate had claimed suzerainty
over the Banda Islands in the sixteenth century, but enforced it sporadically and in a rather nominal
fashion—for the purpose of exacting small tributes, for example. If wemay believe Portuguese sources,
the submission of the Bandanese had been entirely voluntary. In 1607, the Sultan of Ternate had
accepted the VOC as his protector (beschermheer) in the ﬁght against the Spanish and Portuguese,
and agreed to sell the company all spices harvested in his dominions. For a certain section of the Ban-
danese population, this made the ruler—a co-religionist—an ideal mediator in the worsening conﬂict
with the VOC. According to Dedel, the Bandanese had sought the Sultan’s ‘aid and consolation’, and
entreated his intercession on their behalf. When Reael arrived in the Banda Islands in early April, he
brought with him the ruler’s reply, addressed to the Bandanese ‘in general’. According to Dedel, the
message was ‘not unfavourable to us [i.e., the Dutch]’. The inhabitants of Great Banda and Rosengain
treated the letter ‘with great reverence and respect’, but refused to show it to the inhabitants of Pulo
61TNA, CO 77/1 f. 109v, 110r (copy, Laurens Reael to Nathaniel Courthope, 21 April 1617, signed by Reael).
62Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, IV, 524–531 (quotation on p. 531); EIC Letters, V, 345–52.
63NA, VOC1064, f. 227v–229v (Dedel to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 10 May 1617 –all quotations are taken from this letter), see
also 232r-v (Dirck Pieter van de Sande to the Amsterdam VOC Directors, 9 May 1617) and f. 28r-31r (resolutions signed by Reael
and the Councillors of the Indies at Castle Nassau, 9, 16, 26, 28 April, and 4 May 1617); Van Goor, Coen, 352.
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Run or send the latter a copy, claiming that all bonds between them had been severed. Needless to say,
the ruler’s intervention may well have been decisive in persuading various orangkayas on Rosengain
and Great Banda to enter into peace negotiations with Reael in late April 1617.64
The reaction of the inhabitants of Pulo Run reveals just how important Sultan Mudaffar’s letters
was for the Bandanese. It also spelled trouble for Courthope. According to Dedel, the inhabitants of
Pulo Run managed to obtain a copy of the Sultan’s letter from the Ternatan crew of ‘a small junk
ﬁlled with sago’—undoubtedly foodstuffs intended for the hungry Bandanese. With an eye to the
peace negotiations, the inhabitants of Pulo Run felt the need to formulate a proper response to
the Sultan’s letter, declaring that ‘they wanted to live in peace with [the Dutch]’ and ‘let the whites
deal with the whites’, but could not in good conscience get rid of the English, ‘who had treated them
so well’. Their response failed to impress Dedel, who dismissed it as mere ‘pretext’. The Bandanese
had always preferred to ‘trade with two nations rather than one’, and thus stay in control of the spice
trade.65
Yet Dedel may have drawn his conclusions too quickly. The written exchanges between the Ban-
danese and the Sultan of Ternate clearly alarmed Courthope. In his own letters, the English merchant
was adept at painting a black-and-white picture of the natives’ relationships with the Dutch and the
English—allegedly, irreconcilable enmity and hatred versus sweetness and light. He did not have
much choice. Should he so much as hint that the Bandanese wavered in their loyalties, how could
he justify sinking all his resources into the defence of Pulo Run, with little to show for it? No nutmeg
or mace would reach the English factory at Bantam that year. In his letter of 25 April, Courthope
mentioned the replies that the Bandanese had received from the Sultan of Ternate and Cimelaha
Sabadin, but immediately dismissed these last two as ‘slaves to the Hollanders’. Why the outrage?
Could it be because he knew that Sultan Mudaffar had advised the Bandanese to submit to the
Dutch, on the grounds that ‘there is no nation that can compare with them for forces’—to cite
Courthope’s own paraphrase of the ruler’s reply? Curiously, the merchant made no allusion whatso-
ever to the response of the inhabitants of Pulo Run. Dedel’s letter is our only source. Was Courthope
unsettled by the thought that his Bandanese allies—putative subjects of James I—might act upon the
advice of a Muslim suzerain? There is no doubt that Reael beneﬁted from the Sultan’s letter in nego-
tiating a new treaty with the inhabitants of Great Banda and Rosengain. Still, peace would remain
elusive in the Banda Islands.66
Reael and Dedel left the Banda Islands in early July 1617. The Governor-General expected the
English to vacate Pulo Run before long. Two Dutch ships remained in the Banda Islands in order
to instil in the natives greater loyalty to the VOC. At the change of the monsoon winds, the ships
would go on patrol in the waters west of Pulo Run, in case English relief forces should try to
reach the island. Reael was conﬁdent that he would ﬁnd a large Dutch ﬂeet in Bantam at the start
of the western monsoon, capable of intercepting any English vessel that dared to set sail for the
64NA, VOC 1064 f. 229v (all quotations are taken from this source); Villiers, ‘Trade and society in the Banda Islands in the sixteenth
century’ 730; Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel, I, 50–52, 61–63, 75–78; Van Goor, Coen 225,
293–294, 354. Cimelaha Sabadin governed Luhu and Cambello on the island of Ceram on behalf of the ruler of Ternate. He is
mentioned in TNA, CO 77/1, f. 100–101, for example. John Jourdain came into contact with him during a visit to Ambon in 1613.
Jourdain’s journal conﬁrms that ‘Cambello, Lugho and Lasede, with other towns’ on the island of Ceram were subject to the
Sultan of Ternate. The Englishman dismissed the ruler as a puppet and, indeed, a prisoner of the Dutch—‘for the [Sultan]
doth nothinge butt what the Hollanders please’; see Jourdain, Journal, 273. Van Goor makes the point that Sultan Mudaffar
of Ternate is described as a friend, rather than a vassal, in the 1609 treaty with the VOC. Indeed, the Company was happy to
return to the ruler various Moluccan islands captured from the Spanish and Portuguese in the early 1610s. Reael had a good
personal relationship with the Sultan. Still, as Governor of the Moluccas, he had few qualms about explicitly instructing the
ruler not to have any dealings with the English; see Van Goor, Coen, 225, 349–54; Van Ittersum, Proﬁt and Principle, 436–46.
65NA, VOC 1064, f. 229v.
66NA, VOC 1064, f. 229v; EIC Letters, V, 351 (Courthope and Spurway to the English President at Bantam, 15 April 1617 o.s.); Van
Goor, Coen, 293–94. Both Dedel and Reael were aware of deep divisions among the Bandanese. In the report that Reael sub-
mitted to the Dutch States General in March 1620, he noted that the Bandanese were ‘accustomed to liberty’, and, though
bound to the VOC by treaty and contract, wavered endlessly in their loyalties. Orangkayas could reach internal agreement
only ‘with great difﬁculty’. Indeed, it frequently happened that ‘young Bandanese [broke] the solemn promises made by their
elders’; see Van Opstall, ‘Reael in de Staten-Generaal’, in Nederlandse Historische Bronnen, edited by A.C.F. Koch e.a., I 197.
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Spice Islands—‘we will be the strongest’. Since Bandanese proas still visited the island of Ceram to
obtain rice from Javanese merchants—in exchange for spices, of course—the Governor-General had
dispatched Dedel to put an end to this. Dedel received authorisation to either buy the cargoes of rice
in their entirety or persuade the Javanese merchants to anchor in the roadstead of Castle Victoria at
Ambon. It was not to be. The young man became gravely ill and died during the crossing to Ceram.
Reael deplored his untimely death in a letter to the VOC directors of 2 July 1617, ‘both for the com-
pany’s sake and for my own’. Dedel’s penetrating insight and mature judgement were seldom found
in older company employees, ‘let alone the younger, giddier ones’. The Governor-General continued
on to the Moluccas. His visit to Ternate was a brief one. In early October, he arrived at Bantam with
three ships and a frigate in order to consult with Jan Pieterszoon Coen about the situation in the
Spice Islands. As Director-General, Coen was the VOC’s second-in-command in the East Indies.
It was the ﬁrst time the two men met in person.67
8. Defending Dutch Claims to the Spice Trade in Jakarta and Bantam
The Dutch secondary literature tends to create a stark contrast between Jan Pieterszoon Coen—a
Counter Remonstrant with a ﬁerce and decisive personality—and Laurens Reael—allegedly, a ‘gentle’
Remonstrant and broadminded humanist, but lacking in leadership skills. It is certainly true that
Coen boasted in his correspondence about his bruising confrontations with pretty much anybody
perceived to be standing in the company’s way. As Van Goor notes, Coen consistently advocated
a hard line against the VOC’s native enemies and European competitors. He had the advantage
of being stationed in Bantam and Jakarta, where he received letters from the Gentlemen XVII
months before Reael did in the Spice Islands. Nor did he eschew political manipulation. When he
forwarded the directors’ letters of December 1615, in which they explicitly authorised the use of
force against the English, he shared their contents with other Councillors of the Indies, including
Steven van der Haghen, just to make sure that the Governor-General would abide by the directors’
instructions. Still, we give Coen too much credit if we cast him as the proverbial evil genius behind
VOC policy. The measures which Reael and he adopted jointly in late 1617 to safeguard the com-
pany’s monopoly of the spice trade were completely in line with the policies which Reael and
Dedel had formulated in the Banda Islands that spring. The resolutions taken by the Governor-Gen-
eral and the Councillors of the Indies in Bantam and Jakarta conceptualised hostilities in Asian
waters in much the same terms as before, referencing treaties with the natives, actual possession,
and just war, through which the company could and did acquire territorial sovereignty.68
On 19 November, Reael gave orders in Jakarta to attack any European interloper encountered in
‘those places where we possess fortresses and trading posts’ and where contracts obliged the natives
to ‘sell the produce of the land exclusively to us’. By supplying food and ammunition to ‘our enemies,
both Spanish and Bandanese’, European interlopers had sought to hollow out ‘our contracts’. They
were given a ﬁnal warning to leave the Spice Islands, or risk having their ships captured, conﬁscated
and incorporated into the VOC ﬂeet. Reael continued in this vein in an ultimatum issued to the Eng-
lish the following day. He accused Courthope of having supplied food and ammunition to Bandanese
enemies of the VOC, against whom the company fought ‘a just war’, as well as having ‘formally taken
up arms against us’ through the establishment of batteries on Pulo Run. He demanded that the island
67NA, VOC 1064 f. 3v, 10v (Reael to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 10 May and 2 July 1617) and f. 39r (resolution of the Governor-
General and Councillors of the Indies, 2 June 1617), VOC 1066 f. 375v-378r (Herman van Speult to the Amsterdam VOC directors,
19 Aug. 1617); Cornelis Buijsero te Bantam, 1616-1618, edited by J.W. IJzerman (The Hague, 1923) 101; Stapel, Geschiedenis van
Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, pp. 104–11; Van Goor, Coen 285–87, 293–94.
68W.Ph. Coolhaas, ‘Over karakter en daden van J. Pz. Coen’ in: Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde VIII
(1943-44) no. 4, 201–237, and no. 5, 60–74; M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European inﬂuence in the Indonesian archi-
pelago, 1500-1630 (The Hague, 1962) 196–222; Meilink-Roelofsz, ’Steven van der Haghen (1563-1624)’ in Vier eeuwen varen, edi-
ted by Akveld; Van Goor, Coen 349–359; Jan Pieterszoon Coen: Bescheiden Omtrent Zijn Bedrijf in Indië, edited by H. T.
Colenbrander and W. Ph. Coolhaas, 7 vols. (The Hague, 1919–1952), I, 269 (Coen to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 22 August
1617) and 320–321 (Coen to the Gentlemen XVII, 10 January 1618).
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be vacated and restored to its original state. English ships heading towards the Spice Islands would be
attacked and conﬁscated. In order that nobody could claim ignorance of the ultimatum, he arranged
for copies to be afﬁxed to the doors of the Dutch factories in Jakarta and Bantam.69
On 23 November, news reached Jakarta that violent brawls had broken out between the English
and the Dutch in Bantam the previous day. It was not the ﬁrst time. On this particular occasion, the
brawls resulted from a Dutch attempt to recapture fugitive Spanish and Portuguese prisoners who
had sought refuge in the English factory in Bantam. The English and their supporters—two hundred
and ﬁfty armed men in total, among whom were quite a few Bandanese—responded with an attack
on a VOC warehouse in Bantam, killing three Japanese guards. On the English side, the losses con-
sisted of one dead (a Bandanese, in fact) and three wounded. Reael reacted with a second ultimatum,
demanding that the English either punish the culprits or surrender them to the Dutch. This second
ultimatum was delivered into the hands of George Ball four days later, together with the previous
one. Needless to say, it did nothing to improve relations with the English merchants in Bantam.70
Reael received three replies to his ultimatums, two signed by George Ball on 29 November and
another signed by Henry Pepwell, commander of the Charles, the following day. In his replies,
Ball was his usual acerbic self. He contended that the Dutch had ‘most unjustly’ captured English
ships and goods, and murdered and imprisoned the crews, in contravention of the ‘bandes of
amity’ between James I of England and the Dutch States General. Ball dismissed Reael’s complaint
that the English had colluded with the Bandanese in circumventing the VOC contracts and kidnap-
ping ‘the newe Christian Chiauwers’. In his view, it was just one more example of ‘your accustomed
untruthes’. He did not intend to raze English fortiﬁcations on Pulo Run or vacate the island, quite the
contrary! Since Pulo Run belonged to the ‘crowne of England’, he could defend it ‘in all reason’
against the ‘injust demands and actions’ of the Dutch. He then proceeded to issue an ultimatum
of his own. It was entirely lawful for the English to take up arms in self-defence. Unless Reael
gave up his ‘evil beginnings’, the Governor-General would bear full responsibility for any effusion
of ‘Christian blood’. Ball was equally obstructionist in his second reply to Reael, pooh-poohing
both the English attack on the Dutch warehouse in Bantam on 22 November and other violent
brawls that had occurred in the streets of Bantam ﬁve months earlier. Ball loftily declared: ‘I
denye not justice, but where it is refused to bee done anew’. If Reael looked more closely into
these incidents, he would ﬁnd that the blame lay fairly and squarely with ‘the insolencie of thie
people’, not the English. Should the Dutch engage in any more hostilities, they would not be righting
themselves, but wronging the English, ‘which God, the world and your consience will one day acuse
you for’.71
Captain Henry Pepwell, who had arrived in Bantam in July 1617, was equally ﬁrm in his reply
to Reael, albeit more diplomatic in his wording. The English had not done anything unworthy of
‘honest men or the honour of our nation’. The commissions issued by James I and the EIC direc-
tors prohibited the use of violence unless ‘ﬁrst provoked thereunto’—instructions which Pepwell
had followed to the letter. Yet he also knew—as did Reael—that ‘neither the lawe of God nor of
nations forbid to succour the afﬂicted’. When people decided of their own free will to ‘become the
69NA, VOC 1066 f. 199–200 (Reael’s orders to all VOC personnel to attack European interlopers in the Spice Islands, 19 November
1617) and f. 194–196 (Reael’s ultimatums addressed to the English at Bantam, 20 and 23 November 1617); Van Goor, Coen 285–
87, 294, 301–06, 349–59. On Isaac le Maire’s attempts to break the VOC monopoly of Dutch trade with Asia, see R.C. Bakhuizen
van den Brink, ‘Isaac le Maire’ in: Dutch Authors on Asian History: A Selection of Dutch Historiography on the Verenigde Oostindische
Compagnie, edited by M.AP. Meilink-Roelofsz, M.E. van Opstall, and G.J. Schutte (Dordrecht, 1988), 29–75
70 NA, VOC 1066 f. 201r–203r (three attestations signed by VOC personnel in Bantam regarding the violent brawls with the English
on 22 November 1617) and f. 194–196 (Reael’s ultimatums addressed to the English at Bantam, 20 and 23 November 1617); EIC
Letters, VI, 206–07 (‘Frenchmen’s relation concerning the Hollanders’ abuses of the English, 1617’), 312–315 (‘French account of
events at Bantam, July-December 1617’); Buijsero te Bantam, edited by IJzerman, 71–76, 105–106; Van Goor, Coen, 294–306.
71EIC Letters, VI, 308-315 (‘English replies to the Dutch protest’, signed by George Ball (A) and Henry Pepwell (B), and ‘French
account of events at Bantam, July–December 1617’); NA, VOC 1066 f. 196–198 (two replies to the Dutch protests, signed by
George Ball on 19 November 1617 o.s., and a reply to the Dutch protests signed by Henry Pepwell on 20 November 1617 o.
s.), f. 201r–203r (three attestations signed by VOC personnel in Bantam regarding the violent brawls with the English on 22
November 1617); Coen: Bescheiden I, 269; Buijsero te Bantam, edited by IJzerman 76, 167; Van Goor, Coen 305.
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vassals of a king or monarch’, as the Bandanese had done by subjecting themselves to James I of
England, they were received into the protection of the ruler or his representatives. There was
another reason why Dutch claims to the Spice Islands did not stand up in law. Pepwell feigned
ignorance of any ‘just domminion or superiority’ over the Spice Islands other than the title of the
King of Spain and Portugal, whose subjects had been ‘the ﬁrst Christians that discovered and con-
quered in these parts’. Clearly, Pepwell assumed that these competing natural law claims were
entirely intelligible to his Dutch interlocutors. Although they operated within a shared legal fra-
mework, the English and Dutch parted company when it came to the signiﬁcance each side
attached to different claims. For example, the author of Mare Liberum rejected the Iberian title
of discovery as totally inapplicable to monsoon Asia, which, far from being undiscovered, had
been known to the Ancients.72
Constructing his own hierarchy of natural law claims, Pepwell contended that the Bandanese sur-
render of sovereignty to James I of England trumped both the VOC’s trading contracts with the
inhabitants of the Spice Islands and Philip III’s titles of discovery and conquest. It is revealing
what Pepwell chose not to mention in his reply to Reael. He ignored the fact that the VOC had con-
quered and built numerous fortresses in the Spice Islands since 1605, and kept sizeable garrisons of
soldiers there. Garrisoned fortresses were understood by the VOC as clear markers of sovereignty.
The contracts that Lam and Reael had concluded with the Bandanese in 1616 and 1617 explicitly
designated the inhabitants of Nera and Pulo Way as VOC subjects, on the grounds that the company
had conquered both islands in a just war, and built and garrisoned fortresses there. Even Courthope,
who ﬁercely contested the VOC’s claims to the Banda Islands, recognised that the Dutch fortresses
on Nera and Pulo Way denoted actual possession of those islands. It certainly informed his concep-
tualisation of the English claim to Pulo Run. The establishment of English batteries on the island and
his long sojourn there were proofs of actual possession. In the hierarchy of natural law claims con-
structed by Courthope, these proofs were just as important as his treaty with the Bandanese of
December 1616, if not more so.73
In his reply to Reael, Pepwell obliquely referenced the argument of actual possession in the con-
text of European politics. He reminded Reael that the English had given many testimonies of their
‘sincere and true affection to your nacion’. Had Elizabeth I not staunchly defended Dutch ‘liberties’,
even though thousands of her subjects lost their lives in the wars against the King of Spain and Por-
tugal? Had James I of England not handed back the ‘strongholds which he possessed’ in the province
of Zeeland, in order to show the world ‘how upright and just a prince and monarch’ he was? Ever
since the Treaty of Nonsuch of 1585, the Zeeland towns of Brill, Flushing and Rammekens had
served as sureties for the repayment of Elizabeth I’s war loans, and had been garrisoned by English
soldiers. However, James I had been reluctant to press any claims of actual possession or sover-
eignty. In his 1604 peace treaty with Spain, the monarch declared himself bound by Elizabeth I’s
arrangements and unable to hand over the so-called ‘cautionary towns’ to Philip III of Spain and
Portugal. When the United Provinces repaid the war loans in full in April 1616, the King withdrew
the English garrisons and returned the towns to Dutch rule. Pepwell expected the VOC to reward
James’ statesmanship and generosity by accommodating, not prohibiting, English trade in the Spice
Islands.74
72EIC Letters, VI, 310–11 and NA, VOC 1066 f. 198 (Pepwell’s reply to the Dutch protests, 20 November 1617 o.s.); Buijsero te Bantam,
edited by IJzerman, 76, 227; Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, translated by Richard Hakluyt, edited by David Armitage (Indianapolis, IN,
2004) 14.
73EIC Letters, VI, 310–11 and NA, VOC 1066 f. 198 (Pepwell’s reply to the Dutch protests, 20 November 1617 o.s.); Corpus Diplomat-
icum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel I 122–124, 127–130; Van Goor, Coen 305.
74EIC Letters, VI, 310–11 and NA, VOC 1066 f. 198 (Pepwell’s reply to the Dutch protests, 20 November 1617 o.s.); A General Collection
of Treatys, Manifestos, Contracts of Marriage, Renunciations, and other Publick Papers, from the Year 1495, to the Year 1712, edited
by Stephen Whatley (second edition, London, 1732) 136 (article VII of the 1604 treaty between James I of England and Philip III of
Spain and Portugal and Archdukes Albert and Isabella); J.C. Grayson, ’From Protectorate to Partnership: Anglo-Dutch relations,
1598–1625’ (University of London, 1978) 32, 34, 55–68, 168–173; Buijsero te Bantam, edited by IJzerman, 227; Van Goor,
Coen, 305.
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Upon arrival in the East Indies, Pepwell had been disappointed to discover that the ‘good turns’ of
the English monarchs meant very little to the Dutch. Reael and his men seemed intent upon breaking
‘the long continued amity and peace’ between the two nations, ‘causelessly’ complaining about
‘wrongs and outrages’ for which the Dutch alone bore responsibility. Given these ‘unchristianlike
proceedings’, how could the English have reacted any differently than they did? Pepwell then issued
an ultimatum of his own. He protested before ‘Almighty God and the worlde’ that, if the Dutch con-
tinued to attack English ships, they alone would be responsible for any ensuing bloodshed.75
The replies of Ball and Pepwell must have disappointed Reael. Writing to the Amsterdam VOC
directors in July 1617, he was conﬁdent that Courthope and his men had acted without proper auth-
orisation from ‘their king and their superiors’, and that a quick visit to the English President at Ban-
tam could resolve the matter. Clearly, that dream had gone up in smoke. Reael was not naïve,
however. He explained in his letter of May 1617 that he had already given orders for a sizeable
ﬂeet, outnumbering the English, to be assembled at Java at the start of the western monsoon,
with the aim of pursuing with ‘double capacity’ any EIC vessel that tried to set sail for the Spice
Islands. Plan B was implemented by means of the ultimatum of 20 November 1617. The gloves
had come off.76
When news arrived in Jakarta of the violent street brawls in Bantam, Jaspar Jansen Jr received
instructions to take two ships to Bantam and join two other Dutch ships there in order to demand
justice from the local ruler, the Pangoran of Bantam. On 5 December 1617, the Governor-General
and the Councillors of the Indies decided to send the ‘remaining ships’ to Bantam as well, in order to
cruise for English vessels and prevent any departures for the Spice Islands. A day later, two Dutch
yachts intercepted and searched an English vessel about to leave the port of Bantam, on suspicion
that it was heading for Makassar and thence to the Spice Islands. The English crew did not exactly
cooperate. A ﬁght broke out on board the vessel, which left one Englishman wounded and another
killed. Anglo–Dutch relations in Bantam had hit rock bottom.77
9. Back to the Banda Islands: Reael and Lam Attempt to Assert VOC Sovereignty
through Jus Conquestus
In Reael’s view, it was imperative to keep a sufﬁcient number of ships in the Spice Islands to intercept
and arrest any European interlopers. He left Jakarta in early January 1618, at the start of the western
monsoon. Upon arrival at Ambon, he learned that the mortality rates at Castles Nassau, Belgica and
Revenge had risen dramatically due to the ravages of tropical disease. One Dutch governor of the
Banda Islands had died already, while his successor was gravely ill. The capture of three indigenous
vessels lacking Dutch passports had ruptured the tenuous peace with the Bandanese. None of this
came as a surprise to the Governor-General, who protested forcefully against the company’s policy
to exclude Asian merchants from the Spice Islands in letters written to the Amsterdam VOC direc-
tors that summer. Steven van der Haghen and Jan Dirkszoon Lam did so as well. The three men
crossed over to the Banda Islands together, reaching Nera in late March 1618. While they passed
by Pulo Run, they did not see any English vessels lying in the roadstead. Reael intended to keep it
that way. He ordered four Dutch ships to cruise west of Pulo Run, in order to intercept and arrest
any English vessels that attempted to reach the island. On 4 April 1618, Courthope watched in des-
pair as Dutch ships engaged the Solomon and Attendance—the ﬁght lasted from ‘two of the clocke till
nine at night’—and managed to capture both. The English vessels, which carried cargoes of rice
obtained at Makassar, were triumphantly towed into the roadstead of Nera. Their crews, ‘stripped
out of all money and clothes’, were distributed over the Dutch ﬂeet. There were now over sixty
75EIC Letters, VI, 310–11 and NA, VOC 1066 f. 198 (Pepwell’s reply to the Dutch protests, 20 November 1617 o.s.); Van Goor, Coen,
305.
76NA, VOC 1064 f. 10r, 3v and VOC 1066 f. 194–196
77NA, VOC 1066 f. 7–10 (resolutions taken by the Governor-General and Councillors of the Indies, 13 October–6 December 1617);
Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 109–11; Van Goor, Coen, 305–307.
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English prisoners in the Spice Islands. Master Cassarian David, the imprisoned commander of the
English squadron, wrote to Courthope at Reael’s behest. The Governor-General was eager to reopen
face-to-face negotiations. Courthope did not take the bait, however. He protested that he would resist
a Dutch invasion of Pulo Run with all his might. Was it idle talk? Since no English relief force had
been able to reach Pulo Run, Lam fully expected Courthope to be lynched by his own Bandanese
allies—yet the Englishman turned out to have more staying power than Lam anticipated.78
Tropical disease and inclement weather took their toll on the Dutch in the Banda Islands in spring
and summer 1618, wreaking havoc with Reael’s plans to deal decisively with both Courthope and the
Bandanese. Lam noted in his letter to the Amsterdam VOC directors that the Governor-General had
to sort out the various problems largely on his own. Disease and death dramatically reduced the
number of VOC ofﬁcers and merchants capable of assisting him in his duties. Philip Zuerius,
died in the middle of April, for example. The weather conditions were not favourable to Reael’s mili-
tary plans either. Strong winds and heavy rain prevented a military assault on the island of Great
Banda in the month of May. When an attack was launched on 4 June—Lam commanded eight com-
panies of soldiers, ﬁve hundred and eighty men in total—it proved too difﬁcult to scale the Banda-
nese fortiﬁcations, erected high in the mountains. The following day, a decision in principle was
taken to invade Pulo Run, but again the weather refused to cooperate: ﬁrst becalmed seas then
heavy rains and strong winds made a landing impossible. All plans for an invasion were shelved
at the start of July. By that time, Lam had fallen dangerously ill—he managed to recover, though.
Clearly, factors beyond Reael’s control prevented him from bringing all the Banda Islands under
VOC control, rather than his supposed indecisiveness. Twentieth-century Dutch historians have
given too much credence to Coen’s correspondence, which is, indeed, full of denunciations of the
Governor-General.79
Still, Reael left the Banda Islands in July 1618 with an achievement of sorts. He noted in his letter
to the Amsterdam VOC directors that the inhabitants of Selamon (on Great Banda) were selling their
mace at Castle Nassau again. The VOC’s Contractboeken contain an agreement to this effect, signed
by Reael and the village’s ‘orangkayas and magistrates’. The Governor-General used the opportunity
to strengthen VOC claims to the Banda Islands, and impose more restrictions on indigenous naviga-
tion than ever before. For example, Bandanese ﬁshermen were not permitted to beach their proas on
the island of Nera. Clearly, the Governor-General believed that, like all other sovereigns, the VOC
was entitled to regulate access to its territory. In addition, the Bandanese were expected to abide
by European rules for siege warfare. If the Selamonese wished to sail to other places on the island
of Great Banda, they would have to ﬂy a white ﬂag, for instance. Should Bandanese vessels encounter
Dutch ships, they were required, ‘if shot at’, to take in their sails and allow a search. If they were in
possession of valid passports, they would receive free passage, of course. The Governor-General and
the Councillors of the Indies can have had few illusions that this truce treaty with the inhabitants of
Selamon would last any longer than the previous agreements. The other villages on Great Banda
remained deﬁant, and allied with Pulo Run—yet Reael had to continue his voyage to Ambon and
78NA, VOC 1067 f. 133–138 (Reael to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 7 May and 10 June 1618), f. 178–183 (Steven van der Haghen to
the Amsterdam VOC directors, 6 May and 10 June 1618), f. 186–188 (Jan Dirckszoon Lam to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 10
June 1618), VOC 1068 f. 355 (Martin van der Strenghe to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 15 Aug. 1618); Purchas, Hakluytus Post-
humus, V, 93–95 (all quotations from this source); Generale Missiven, I, 82–86 (Reael to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 7 May and
11 July 1618); Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 111–112; Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European inﬂu-
ence 209–218.
79NA, VOC 1067 f. 133–138, 178–183, 186–188, VOC 1068 f. 216–217 (Reael to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 11 July 1618), f. 230–
234 (resolutions of the Governor–General and Councillors of the Indies, 19 June–10 July 1618); Generale Missiven, I, 86; Geschie-
denis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 111–123; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 275; Bouwstoffen, I, xxxiii;
Menno Witteveen, Antonio van Diemen: De Opkomst van de VOC in Azië (Amsterdam, 2011) 77–96; Van Goor, Coen, 286, 316.
The correspondence of Jan Pieterszoon Coen and many other documents relating to his VOC career were published in Coen:
Bescheiden. Needless to say, it is far easier (and quicker) to consult this massive source publication than to read the handwritten
letters of Reael, Lam, Dedel, etc. at the Dutch National Archives in The Hague. Van Goor notes in his biography of Coen that Reael
addressed far fewer letters to the VOC directors in the period 1611–1619 than Coen did. Judged by sheer quantity, then, the
written evidence heavily favours Coen; see Van Goor, Coen, 189–92.
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the Moluccas, where the VOC’s native allies were becoming restless as well. It was hardly a coinci-
dence that an English interloper, the Thomas, managed to obtain a cargo of cloves from the ruler of
Tidore that summer.80
Reael’s tenure as Governor-General was coming to an end. The Gentlemen XVII had decided in
October 1617 to give the top job to Coen instead. Their appointment letter suggests that they wanted
the Governor-General to reside in Bantam to oversee the shipment of rich cargoes to the Dutch
Republic, rather than ﬁght expensive wars against the Spanish and Portuguese in the Moluccas.
They nevertheless expected Coen to pay a visit to the Spice Islands ﬁrst—‘to put everything in
order’—and hoped to receive news of the conquest of Pulo Run before long. Ominously, they
were all in favour of peopling the island with Chinese settlers, as Coen had suggested in one of
his letters. Van der Haghen and Reael received honourable discharges, and were recalled to the
Dutch Republic. Yet the directors stipulated that both men would remain Councillors of the Indies
until their departure for Amsterdam, voting second and third in any meeting called by the governor-
general.81
Coen received the news of his appointment in late April 1618, and immediately wrote to Reael
and Van der Haghen. It took a while for the directors’ decisions to be implemented, however.
Both van der Haghen and Reael were too ill to return to Bantam that autumn. Coen preferred to
stay in Jakarta to oversee the construction of a Dutch fortress there—a highly controversial building
project, to say the least. Growing opposition from both the English and the rulers of Jakarta and Ban-
tam spilled over into open warfare in December 1618. When the English gained temporary maritime
dominance, thanks to the ﬂeets of Martin Pring and Sir Thomas Dale meeting up in Bantam, Coen
ﬁnally set sail for Ambon in order to collect more ships, soldiers and ammunition. In March 1619, he
took his oath of ofﬁce at Castle Victoria, in the presence of both Van der Haghen and Reael. The two
men returned with him to Jakarta. In late May, Coen managed to relieve the Dutch fortress there and
completely destroy the indigenous town. Conquered in a ‘just war’—or so the Dutch thought—
Jakarta was renamed Batavia, and became the nucleus of the VOC’s territorial sovereignty on the
island of Java. Coen was not ﬁnished yet. He started a maritime blockade of Bantam, and sent
out various vessels in pursuit of the English. In July, John Jourdain was caught and killed at Patani,
a port on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula.82
Reael and van der Haghen took ship for the Dutch Republic in August 1619, and arrived home
after a six-month voyage. It was the ﬁrst time a Dutch Governor-General had returned alive from the
East Indies. In March 1620, the VOC directors offered Reael a gold medal with a ‘glorious inscrip-
tion’, commemorating his very real achievements in the East. The report that he wrote on his tenure
as Governor-General survives in the archives of the Dutch States General until this day. Indeed, it
soon became clear that the VOC could not do without his expertise in Asian affairs. In 1625, he
became a VOC director in the Amsterdam Chamber, a position he retained until his death in 1637.83
80Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 112, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, edited by Heeres and Stapel,
I, 134–135 (all quotations are taken from this source); NA, VOC 1068 f. 221–222 (Reael to the Amsterdam VOC directors, 20 August
1618), f. 230–234 (resolutions of the Governor–General and Councillors of the Indies, 19 June–10 July 1618); on the Contractboe-
ken, see footnote 58 above. According to the treaty text, the orankayas of Selamon also signed on behalf of the inhabitants of
Rosengain and the villages of Wayer and Dender on Great Banda. In reality, their sympathies lay with the Bandanese on Pulo Run.
81Pieter van Dam’s Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie 1693–1701, edited by F. W. Stapel and C. W. T. baron van Boetzelaer
van Asperen en Dubbeldam, 7 vols (The Hague, 1927–1954), III, 6–7; Coen: Bescheiden, IV, 376–390 (Gentlemen XVII to Coen, 25
October 1617); Van Goor, Coen, 345–59. Increasing conﬂicts between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants in the Dutch
Republic may also have played a role in Reael’s dismissal and Coen’s appointment as Governor-General. Not many VOC directors
in Amsterdam relished the thought of Arminius’ brother-in-law directing their affairs in the East Indies.
82Geschiedenis van Nederlands Indië, edited by Stapel, III, 111–146; Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 272–274; Witteveen,
Van Diemen 77–96; Van Goor, Coen 308–319, 326–359.
83Dutch-Asiatic Shipping, edited by Bruijn, Gaastra, and Schöffer, III, voyage 5133.2; Van Dam’s Beschryvinge, edited by Stapel and
Boetzelaer, III (RGP 87) 6–7; Van Opstall, ‘Laurens Reael in de Staten-Generaal’, in Nederlandse Historische Bronnen, edited by A.C.F.
Koch e.a., I (1979), 175–213. The VOC directors rewarded Reael handsomely for his services. In addition to the gold medal, he
received a lump sum of approximately two-and-a-half thousand guilders and a salary of six hundred guilders a month during
his tenure as Governor-General. Coen received the same salary following his appointment as Governor–General.
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Reael’s distinguished career as a VOC director and Dutch government ofﬁcial—he served the
United Provinces both as an ambassador and an admiral of the navy—contrasted sharply with
the dismal fate awaiting Courthope in the Banda Islands. The ﬂeets of Pring and Dale, assembled
at Bantam in December 1618, were of no help to him. Rather than following Coen to Ambon, Sir
Thomas Dale decided to assist the rulers of Bantam and Jakarta in the siege of the Dutch fortress.
Only a small pinnace arrived at Pulo Run at the end of January 1619, with letters from Dale and
Jourdain encouraging Courthope to hold out and promising speedy assistance. Yet no English ship
appeared on the horizon, neither that year nor the following. As Courthope noted in his journal in
spring 1620, ‘this yeare I had no Letter nor any advice from our Commanders at Bantam, nor any
supply’. News of the capture of seven English ships, including the death of Jourdain, reached Pulo
Run in March 1620. Characteristically, Courthope’s increasingly desperate position did not prevent
him from negotiating with the orangkayas of Great Banda about ‘the surrender of their Land to the
Kings Majestie of England’. He was not entirely sanguine, however: ‘God grant mee good getting
out of these Countrie peoples hands’, he wrote in his journal. He knew that his Bandanese allies
had spent everything they possessed, while quite a few had lost their lives as well, ‘in holding out in
expectation of the English forces’. Should the Bandanese conclude that Courthope could not deli-
ver on his promises, his life would be in mortal danger—just as Lam had predicted. Courthope
never resolved the dilemma. In October 1620, returning from yet another visit to Great Banda,
his proa was intercepted by the Dutch in the waters around Pulo Way. He received a shot in
the chest and then leapt overboard, never to be seen again. Arguably, the fact that Courthope
had been killed by a Dutch bullet, rather than by his Bandanese allies, earned him the status of
a martyr back in England. Samuel Purchas consciously emphasised Courthope’s martyrdom in
selecting documents for publication in Purchas his Pilgrimes (1625). An important source for
the EIC’s early years, its skewed perspective continues to be reproduced in the Anglophone litera-
ture, most recently in Nathaniel’s Nutmeg.84
10. Conclusions
Anglo–Dutch imperial competition in the Spice Islands in the period 1609–1621 was steeped in the
discourse of natural law and the law of nations. In evaluating claims to trade and territory, it was the
framework of choice for VOC and EIC personnel in Asia and diplomats in London and The Hague,
most notably Hugo Grotius. As the VOC directors realised, the rapid expansion of the company’s
territorial and maritime empire required the appointment of trained lawyers to senior positions
in Asia—if only to ensure that the company’s personnel and subjects would live under a well-regu-
lated government. Apart from Reael, at least two other seventeenth-century Governor-Generals had
a background in law, Pieter de Carpentier (g. 1623–1627) and the long-serving Joan Maetsuycker (g.
1653–1678).85 Although little is known about the education of EIC servants in this time period, it is
very clear from the extant documents that they, too, justiﬁed their own conduct with reference to
natural law and the law of nations. Whenever the VOC and EIC came into conﬂict with each
other or with indigenous rulers, merchants and peoples, this discourse assumed particular
importance.
As relative latecomers to the imperial game, both companies loudly proclaimed a universal free-
dom of trade and navigation that could not be annulled by any title of discovery or papal grant.
Dutch and English interloping in the Iberian maritime and territorial empires in Asia went hand
in hand with such verbal attacks on their legitimacy—the one could not have happened without
84Helena Winkel-Rauws, Nederlandsch-Engelsche samenwerking in de Spaansche wateren, 1625–1627 (Amsterdam, 1946) 53–69,
144–192; Van Goor, Coen, 308, 323-359; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, V, 116–119 (letters addressed to Courthope by Sir Thomas
Dale and John Jourdain, December 1618) 119–125 (Courthope’s journal, February 1619-September 1620 –all quotations are taken
from this source), 126–127 (journal of Robert Hayes, October 1620); Foster, England’s Quest of Eastern Trade, 272–276; Milton,
Nathaniel’s Nutmeg.
85Nieuw Nederlandsch Biograﬁsch Woordenboek, VI, columns 273–74 and 983–84.
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the other. Freedom of trade and navigation was an equally potent argument in dealing with recalci-
trant natives. If the VOC and EIC did not get what they wanted, or suspected that competitors
received undue advantages, they were quick to invoke natural law and take matters into their
own hands. For example, both VOC and EIC merchants reviled the Pangoran of Bantam for
most of the 1610s, on account of his alleged ‘tyrannical’ interventions in the Bantam pepper market,
suspending trade if and when he saw ﬁt. As M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz noted in her classic study
Asian Trade and European Inﬂuence in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1630 (1962), the ruler
simply sought to ensure a level playing ﬁeld for all merchants in Bantam, including a large number
of Chinese traders. From the VOC’s perspective, he had transgressed natural law, however, and
deserved condign punishment—hence the maritime blockade of Bantam in summer 1619.86
The story was a great deal more complicated in the Spice Islands. By establishing fortresses in
preparation for the Twelve Years Truce, the VOC sought to tighten up the protection/tribute
exchange with its native allies and strengthen its position as a co-ruler in these territories. The Ban-
danese saw things differently, of course. As Adam Clulow notes, the orangkayas ‘had long been
accustomed to ﬁnding security by playing off foreign powers’.87 Until Verhoef’s arrival in the archi-
pelago, they had treated the VOC as simply one more merchant bidding for their produce. If and
when the VOC failed to supply the trade goods they required, such as textiles and rice, they had
been at liberty to sell their nutmeg and mace to somebody else—and frequently did. Verhoef was
determined to change that. His murder in May 1609 suggests that many Bandanese objected to a
close military alliance with the VOC, and were desperate to prevent the construction of a Dutch for-
tress. Did they suspect that, ultimately, it would result in a complete loss of indigenous sovereignty?
Thanks to Keeling’s presence in the Banda Islands in spring 1609, followed by visits from other
EIC merchants and commanders, native opponents of the VOC were conﬁdent that they could play
off the English against the Dutch and thus regain control of the situation. The Bandanese suffered
from internal divisions, however. According to Reael, they governed themselves ‘entirely in a demo-
cratic fashion [populariter], like a republic’—not exactly a compliment in the seventeenth century.88
It may explain why they dismissed Keeling’s suggestion to surrender their sovereignty to the king of
England. Only in April 1616, when Lam was about to launch an all-out assault, did the inhabitants of
Pulo Way enact a ceremony formally acknowledging James I as their protector. This failed to stop
Lam’s conquest of the island—but it did create a very useful precedent for the EIC. Eight months
later, Courthope had little difﬁculty in persuading inhabitants of Pulo Run—many of whom were
refugees from Pulo Way—to repeat the ceremony and sign a treaty with him.
Meanwhile, VOC ofﬁcials continued to sign contracts with the Bandanese, primarily inhabitants
of Rosengain and Great Banda. The orangkayas of Nera and Pulo Way could no longer be treaty
partners. From the VOC perspective, the islands’ conquest in a just war and the establishment of
Dutch fortresses there had turned local populations into company subjects. By concluding treaties
with inhabitants of Rosengain and Great Banda, both Lam and Reael sought to obtain native recog-
nition of the changed status of Nera and Pulo Way, secure a steady supply of nutmeg and mace for
the VOC, and completely isolate Pulo Run and its inhabitants. Although the Governor-General
failed to launch a successful invasion of Pulo Run, he used all other means at his disposal to
make life difﬁcult for Courthope and his indigenous allies. The wavering loyalties of the Bandanese
proved to be the Achilles’ heel of his strategy. In summer 1618, he signed a truce treaty with the
‘orangkayas and magistrates’ of Selamon, not with any other villages on Great Banda, which had
effectively sided with the inhabitants of Pulo Run.
From the Dutch perspective, the next logical step was to conquer and pacify Great Banda. More
nutmeg trees grew on Great Banda than on all the other islands of the archipelago combined. The
inhabitants of Pulo Run were crucially dependent on foodstuffs and water reaching them from Great
86Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Inﬂuence, 239–259; Van Goor, Coen, 297–349, 361–377.
87Clulow, ‘The Art of Claiming’ 30.
88Van Opstall, ‘Laurens Reael in de Staten-Generaal’, in Nederlandse Historische Bronnen, edited by A.C.F. Koch e.a., I (1979), 197.
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Banda. In other words, a Dutch conquest of the island would make it impossible for the English to
continue in actual possession of Pulo Run. And so it turned out to be. The inhabitants of Great Banda
repulsed Lam’s expeditionary force in June 1618, but were soundly defeated by Coen three years
later. The Treaty of Defence, concluded by the VOC and EIC in London in June 1619, proved an
unexpected beneﬁt in pacifying the archipelago. Since the companies were now ofﬁcially allied,
neither the EIC merchants in Bantam and Jakarta nor the few Englishmen left at Pulo Run dared
to interfere with Coen’s invasion plans, or offer any support to the Bandanese. Yet a monopoly of
the trade in nutmeg and mace came at a high price. Since most Bandanese were killed or put to ﬂight,
the VOC had no choice but to create a new colonial society, leasing plots of land to Dutch perkeniers
and importing thousands of slaves to work the plantations in the archipelago.89
For the VOC and the EIC, treaties concluded with Asian rulers and peoples were essential in stak-
ing out claims to trade and territory. Any document had to serve multiple purposes, both on the
ground in the East Indies and at the negotiating tables back in Europe. The result was a scattershot
approach to claiming. Both companies deployed a constantly changing legal suite, which included
freedom of trade and navigation, contracts and alliances with native peoples, just war, conquest,
actual possession, and the (perceived) surrender of native sovereignty. Europeans lacked a clear
and unambiguous formula for making claims to Asian trade or territory. They were improvising
all the time. This is abundantly evident in the present case study of Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the
Banda islands.
Its maritime dominance in the Spice Islands notwithstanding, the VOC found it difﬁcult to erase
the EIC’s legal claims. Might did not make right. As we have seen, documents signed in the Banda
Islands travelled to Europe with remarkable speed and regularity. Both companies had such effective
channels for circulating information that any change in the legal equation in Asia usually found its
way back to Amsterdam and London, to add to the wider case. Yet key questions remained unan-
swered in negotiations between company ofﬁcials. To whom, and to which goods, did freedom of
trade and navigation apply in the Spice Islands? Did Courthope’s agreement with the inhabitants
of Pulo Run of December 1616 completely annul the long list of treaties between the Dutch and
the Bandanese, dating back to 1599? How important was actual possession—fortiﬁcations, gun bat-
teries, European soldiers and settlers, etc.—as compared to claims derived from treaties? A straight-
forward answer to these questions was not forthcoming. At the Anglo–Dutch colonial conferences of
1613 and 1615, Grotius signally failed to convince his English interlocutors that the VOC’s treaties
with native rulers and peoples had put an end to English freedom of trade in the Spice Islands. Nor
could the companies reach agreement on the relative merits of the various arguments in subsequent
negotiations. Only when the directors put legal claims aside did they succeed in concluding a Treaty
of Defence (1619). According to the treaty text, the EIC was entitled to one third of the spices pro-
duced in the Spice Islands, in return for paying one third of the costs of the VOC’s military establish-
ment there. That, of course, became the sticking point. Unable to keep up with Dutch military
spending, the EIC president in Batavia, Richard Fursland, gave orders in January 1623 to withdraw
all English merchants from the Spice Islands. It was Courthope’s treaty with the inhabitants of Pulo
Run that would keep English claims alive long after any kind of actual possession had ceased.90
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The Netherlands around 1600.
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Europe around 1600
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Java around 1600
Ambon
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Banda Islands
Nugmeg from the Banda Islands, 1599 (Object number: RP-P-OB-75.396)
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View of the Banda Islands (Neyra) (Object number: SK-A-4476)
Portrait of Pieter Willemsz Verhoeff (c. 1573-1609) (Object number: SK-A-1469)
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Portrait of Gerard Reynst (c. 1568–1615) (Object number: SK-A-3756)
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Portrait of Laurens Reael (1583–1637) (Object number: SK-A-3741)
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Portrait of Jan Pietersz Coen (1587–1629) (Object number: SK-A-4528)
Batavia Castle, viewed from Kali Besar West, ca. 1656. (Object number: SK-A-19)
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 43
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 D
un
de
e] 
at 
02
:54
 31
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
